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Abstract
In communication networks secrecy constraints usually incur an extra limit in capacity or generalized degrees-
of-freedom (GDoF), in the sense that a penalty in capacity or GDoF is incurred due to the secrecy constraints.
Over the past decades a significant amount of effort has been made by the researchers to understand the limits of
secrecy constraints in communication networks. In this work, we focus on how to remove the secrecy constraints
in communication networks, i.e., how to remove the GDoF penalty due to secrecy constraints. We begin with
three basic settings: a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, a symmetric
Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, and a two-user symmetric Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel.
Interestingly, in this work we show that adding common randomness at the transmitters can totally remove the
penalty in GDoF or GDoF region of the three settings considered here. The results reveal that adding common
randomness at the transmitters is a powerful way to remove the secrecy constraints in communication networks in
terms of GDoF performance. Common randomness can be generated offline. The role of the common randomness
is to jam the information signal at the eavesdroppers, without causing too much interference at the legitimate
receivers. To accomplish this role, a new method of Markov chain-based interference neutralization is proposed
in the achievability schemes utilizing common randomness. From the practical point of view, we hope to use less
common randomness to remove secrecy constraints in terms of GDoF performance. With this motivation, for most
of the cases we characterize the minimal GDoF of common randomness to remove secrecy constraints, based on
our derived converses and achievability.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the secure communications with secrecy constraints, the confidential messages need to be transmitted
reliably to the legitimate receiver(s), without leaking the confidential information to the eavesdroppers
(cf. [1], [2]). In communication networks secrecy constraints usually impose an extra limit in capacity
or generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF), in the sense that a penalty in capacity or GDoF is incurred
due to secrecy constraints (cf. [2]–[12]). Since Shannon’s work of [1] in 1949, a significant amount of
effort has been made by the researchers to understand the limits of secrecy constraints in communication
networks (cf. [2]–[24] and the references therein). In this work, we focus on how to remove the secrecy
constraints in communication networks, i.e., how to remove the GDoF penalty due to secrecy constraints.
In this work we consider three basic settings: a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel
with secrecy constraints, a symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, and a two-user symmetric
Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel. Interestingly, we show that adding common randomness at
the transmitters can remove the secrecy constraints in these three settings, i.e., it can totally remove
the penalty in GDoF or GDoF region of the three settings. Let us take a two-user symmetric Gaussian
interference channel as an example. For this interference channel without secrecy constraints, the GDoF
is a “W” curve (see Fig. 1 and [25]). If secrecy constraints are imposed on this channel, then the secure
GDoF is significantly reduced, compared to the original “W” curve (see Fig. 1 and [12]). It implies that
a GDoF penalty is incurred due to secrecy constraints. Interestingly we show in this work that adding
common randomness at the transmitters can totally remove the GDoF penalty due to secrecy constraints
(see Fig. 1). The results reveal that adding common randomness at the transmitters is a constructive way
to remove the secrecy constraints in terms of GDoF performance in communication networks.
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Fig. 1. The optimal secure sum GDoF vs. α, for two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channels without and with common randomness
(CR), where α is a channel parameter indicating the interference-to-signal ratio.
The role of the common randomness is to jam the information signal at the eavesdroppers, without
causing too much interference at the legitimate receivers. By jamming the information signal at the
eavesdroppers with common randomness, we seek to remove the penalty in GDoF. However, the jamming
signal generated from the common randomness needs to be designed carefully so that it must not create
too much interference at the legitimate receivers. Otherwise, the interference will incur a new penalty
in GDoF. To accomplish the role of the common randomness, a new method of Markov chain-based
interference neutralization is proposed in the achievability schemes. The idea of the Markov chain-based
interference neutralization method is given as follows: the common randomness is used to generate a
certain number of signals with specific directions and powers; one signal is used to jam the information
signal at an eavesdropper but it will create an interference at a legitimate receiver; this interference will
be neutralized by another signal generated from the same common randomness; the added signal also
creates another interference but will be neutralized by the next generated signal; this process repeats until
the residual interference is under the noise level. Since one signal is used to neutralize the previous signal
and will be neutralized by the next signal, it forms a Markov chain for this interference neutralization
process.
Common randomness can be generated offline. From the practical point of view, we expect to use less
common randomness to remove secrecy constraints, in terms of GDoF performance. With this motivation,
we also characterize the minimal GDoF of the common randomness to remove the secrecy constraints for
most of the cases, based on our derived converses and achievability.
In terms of the organization of this work, section II describes the system models and section III provides
the main results. The converse is described in Section VIII. The achievability is provided in Sections V-VI
and some of the appendices, while a scheme example is described in Section IV. The work is concluded
in Section IX. Regarding the notations, I(•), H(•) and h(•) denote the mutual information, entropy, and
differential entropy, respectively. The notations of Z+, R and N denote the sets of positive integers, real
numbers, and nonnegative integers, respectively. We define that (•)+ = max{•, 0}. We consider all the
logarithms with base 2. The notation of f(a) = o(g(a)) implies that lima→∞ f(a)/g(a) = 0.
II. THE THREE SYSTEM MODELS
For this work we focus on three settings: a two-user interference channel with secrecy constraints, a
wiretap channel with a helper, and a two-user multiple access wiretap channel. These three settings share
a common channel input-output relationship, given as
y1(t) =
√
Pα11h11x1(t) +
√
Pα12h12x2(t) + z1(t), (1)
y2(t) =
√
Pα21h21x1(t) +
√
Pα22h22x2(t) + z2(t), t ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , n} (2)
where x`(t) represents the transmitted signal of transmitter ` at time t, with a normalized power constraint
E|x`(t)|2 ≤ 1; yk(t) is the signal received at receiver k; and zk(t) ∼ N (0, 1) is the additive white Gaussian
noise, for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}. The term √Pαk`hk` captures the channel gain between receiver k and transmitter `,
3where hk` ∈ (1, 2] denotes the channel coefficient. The exponent αk` represents the link strength for the
channel between receiver k and transmitter `. The parameter P ≥ 1 reflects the base of link strength
of all the links. Note that
√
Pαk`hk` can represent any real channel gain bigger or equal to 1. Thus,
the above model in (1) and (2) is able to describe the general channels, in the sense of secure capacity
approximation. The channel parameters {hk`, αk`}k` are assumed to be available at all the nodes. In this
work we focus on the symmetric case such that
α11 = α22 = 1, α12 = α21 = α, α > 0.
The three settings considered here are different, mainly on the number of confidential messages, the
intended receivers of the messages, and the secrecy constraints. In what follows, we will present the
details of three settings.
A. Interference channel with secrecy constraints (IC-SC)
In the setting of interference channel, transmitter ` intends to send the confidential message w` to
receiver ` using n channel uses, where the message w` is independently and uniformly chosen from a set
W`,{1, 2, 3, · · · , 2nR`}, for ` ∈ {1, 2}. To transmit w`, a function
f` :W` ×Wc → Rn
is used to map w` ∈ W` to the signal xn` = f`(w`, wc) ∈ Rn, where wc ∈ Wc denotes the common
randomness that is available at both transmitters but not at the receivers. We assume that wc is uniformly
and independently chosen from a set Wc,{1, 2, · · · , 2nRc}. In our setting, w1, w2 and wc are assumed to
be mutually independent. The rate tuple (R1(P, α), R2(P, α), Rc(P, α)) is said to be achievable if there
exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver can decode its desired message reliably, that
is,
Pr[wˆk 6= wk] ≤ , ∀k ∈ {1, 2}
for any  > 0, and the transmission of the messages is secure, that is,
I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n and I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n
(known as weak secrecy constraints), as n goes large. The secure capacity region C¯(P, α) represents the
collection of all the achievable rate tuples (R1(P, α), R2(P, α), Rc(P, α)). The secure GDoF region D¯(α)
is defined as
D¯(α),
{
(d1, d2, dc) : ∃
(
R1(P, α), R2(P, α), Rc(P, α)
) ∈ C¯(P, α)
s.t. dc = lim
P→∞
Rc(P, α)
1
2
logP
, dk = lim
P→∞
Rk(P, α)
1
2
logP
, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}
}
.
The secure GDoF region D(dc, α) is defined as
D(dc, α),{(d1, d2) : ∃(d1, d2, dc) ∈ D¯(α)}
which is a function of dc and α. The secure sum GDoF is then defined as
dsum(dc, α), max
d1,d2:(d1,d2)∈D(dc,α)
d1 + d2.
For this setting we are interested in the maximal (optimal) secure sum GDoF defined as
d∗sum(α), max
dc:dc≥0
dsum(dc, α).
We are also interested in the minimal (optimal) GDoF of the common randomness to achieve the maximal
secure sum GDoF, defined as
d∗c(α), min
dc: dsum(dc,α)=d∗sum(α)
dc.
Note that degrees-of-freedom (DoF) can be treated as a specific point of GDoF by considering α12 =
α21 = α22 = α11 = 1.
4B. The wiretap channel with a helper (WTH)
In the setting of wiretap channel with a helper, transmitter 1 wishes to send the confidential message
w1 to receiver 1. This setting is slightly different from the previous interference channel setting, as
transmitter 2 will just act as a helper without sending any message in this setting (w2 can be set as
empty). For transmitter 1, the mapping function f1 is similar as that in the interference channel described
in Section II-A. For transmitter 2 (helper), a function f2 : Wc → Rn maps wc ∈ Wc to the signal
xn2 = f2(wc) ∈ Rn, where wc ∈ Wc denotes the common randomness that is available at both transmitters
but not at the receivers. As before, we assume that wc is uniformly and independently chosen from a set
Wc = {1, 2, 3, · · · , 2nRc} and w1 and wc are mutually independent. A rate pair (R1(P, α), Rc(P, α)) is
said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that receiver 1 can reliably decode
its desired message w1 and the transmission of the message is secure such that I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n, for any
 > 0 as n goes large. The secure capacity region C¯(P, α) denotes the collection of all achievable secure
rate pairs (R1(P, α), Rc(P, α)). A secure GDoF region is defined as
D¯(α),
{
(d, dc) : ∃
(
R1(P, α), Rc(P, α)
) ∈ C¯(P, α), s.t. dc = lim
P→∞
Rc(P, α)
1
2
logP
, d = lim
P→∞
R1(P, α)
1
2
logP
}
.
We are interested in the maximal (optimal) secure GDoF defined as
d∗(α), max
d,dc:(d,dc)∈D¯(α)
d.
We are also interested in the minimum (optimal) GDoF of the common randomness to achieve the maximal
secure GDoF, defined as
d∗c(α), min
dc:(d∗(α),dc)∈D¯(α)
dc.
C. Multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT)
Let us now consider the two-user Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel. The system model of this
channel is similar as that of the interference channel defined in Section II-A. One difference is that both
messages w1 and w2 are intended to receiver 1 in this setting. Another difference is that receiver 2 now
is the eavesdropper. Both messages need to be secure from receiver 2 and the secrecy constraint becomes
I(w1, w2; yn2 ) ≤ n. The definitions of the rate tuple (R1(P, α), R2(P, α), Rc(P, α)), secure capacity region
C¯(P, α), and secure GDoF regions D¯(α) and D(dc, α) follow from that in Section II-A. In this setting, the
secure GDoF region D(dc, α) might not be symmetric due to the asymmetric links arriving at receiver 1.
Therefore, instead of the maximal secure sum GDoF, we will focus on the maximal (optimal) secure
GDoF region defined as
D∗(α),{(d1, d2) : ∃(d1, d2) ∈ ∪dcD(dc, α)}.
We are also interested in the minimal (optimal) GDoF of the common randomness to achieve any given
GDoF pair (d1, d2) ∈ D∗(α), defined as
d∗c(α, d1, d2), min
dc:(d1,d2)∈D(dc,α)
dc.
III. THE MAIN RESULTS
We will provide here the main results of the channels defined in Section II. The detailed proofs are
provided in Sections V-VIII, as well as the appendices.
5A. Removing the secrecy constraints
Theorem 1 (IC-SC). For almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 of the symmetric Gaussian
IC-SC channel with common randomness (see Section II-A), the optimal characterization of the secure
sum GDoF is
d∗sum(α) =

2(1− α) for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
(3a)
2α for 1
2
≤ α ≤ 2
3
(3b)
2(1− α/2) for 2
3
≤ α ≤ 1 (3c)
α for 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 (3d)
2 for α ≥ 2. (3e)
This optimal secure sum GDoF is the same as the optimal sum GDoF of the setting without any secrecy
constraint.
Proof. See Section V for the achievability proof. The optimal sum GDoF of the interference channel
without secrecy constraint, which is characterized in [25], is serving as the upper bound of the secure
sum GDoF of this IC-SC channel with common randomness.
Note that, without secrecy constraints, the optimal sum GDoF of the interference channel is a “W”
curve (see [25] and Fig. 1). With secrecy constraints, the secure sum GDoF of the interference channel
is then reduced to a modified “W” curve (cf. [12]). It implies that there is a penalty in GDoF incurred
by the secrecy constraints. Interestingly, Theorem 1 reveals that we can remove this penalty by adding
common randomness, in terms of sum GDoF.
Theorem 2 (WTH). Given the symmetric Gaussian WTH channel with common randomness (see
Section II-B), the optimal secure GDoF is expressed by
d∗(α) = 1, ∀α ∈ [0,∞),
which is the same as the maximal GDoF of the setting without secrecy constraint.
Proof. See Section VI for the achievability proof. Without secrecy constraint, the WTH channel can be
enhanced to a point-to-point channel, and the maximal GDoF of the point-to-point channel is 1.
For the symmetric Gaussian WTH channel without common randomness, the secure GDoF is another
modified “W” curve (cf. [19]). Without secrecy constraint, the maximal GDoF of the setting is 1. Thus,
there is a penalty in GDoF due to secrecy constraint. Theorem 2 reveals that we can remove this GDoF
penalty by adding common randomness.
Theorem 3 (MAC-WT). Given the symmetric Gaussian MAC-WT channel with common randomness (see
Section II-C), the optimal secure GDoF region D∗(α) is the set of all pairs (d1, d2) satisfying
d1 + d2 ≤ max{1, α} (4)
0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1 (5)
0 ≤ d2 ≤ α, (6)
which is the same as the optimal GDoF region of the symmetric Gaussian multiple access channel without
eavesdropper, i.e., without secrecy constraint.
Proof. The achievability proof is provided in Section VII. The optimal GDoF region of the multiple access
channel without secrecy constraint is serving as the outer bound of the optimal secure GDoF region of
the MAC-WT channel with common randomness. The optimal GDoF region of the symmetric Gaussian
multiple access channel is characterized as in (4)-(6), which can be easily derived from the capacity region
of the setting (cf. [26]).
6For the multiple access channel, there is a penalty in GDoF region due to secrecy constraint. For
example, considering the case with α = 1, the optimal sum GDoF of the multiple access channel without
secrecy constraint is 1. With secrecy constraint, i.e., with an eavesdropper, the optimal secure sum GDoF
of multiple access wiretap channel is reduced to 2/3 (cf. [7]). Therefore, secrecy constraint incurs an
extra limit on the GDoF region. Theorem 3 reveals that by adding common randomness we can achieve a
secure GDoF region that is the same as the one without secrecy constraint. In other words, with common
randomness, secrecy constraint will not incur any penalty in GDoF region of the symmetric multiple
access wiretap channel.
B. How much common randomness is required?
The results in Theorems 1-3 reveal that we can remove the secrecy constraints, i.e., remove the penalty
in GDoF, by adding common randomness for each channel considered here. From the practical point of
view, we hope to use less common randomness to remove the secrecy constraints. Therefore, it would
be interesting to characterize the minimal GDoF of the common randomness to achieve this goal. The
results on this perspective are given in the following theorems.
Theorem 4 (IC-SC). For the two-user symmetric Gaussian IC-SC channel, the minimal GDoF of the
common randomness to achieve the maximal secure sum GDoF d∗sum(α) is
d∗c(α) = d
∗
sum(α)/2− (1− α)+ α ∈ [0,∞). (7)
Proof. See Section V for the achievability proof and Section VIII-A for the converse proof.
Theorem 5 (WTH). For the symmetric Gaussian WTH channel, the minimal GDoF of the common
randomness to achieve the maximal secure GDoF d∗(α) is
d∗c(α) = 1− (1− α)+ α ∈ [0,∞). (8)
Proof. See Section VI and Section VIII-B for the achievability and converse proofs, respectively.
For the MAC-WT channel, we were able to characterize the minimal GDoF of the common randomness
to achieve any given GDoF pair (d1, d2) in the maximal secure GDoF regionD∗(1) expressed in Theorem 3,
for the case of α = 1.
Theorem 6 (MAC-WT). Given the symmetric Gaussian MAC-WT channel, and for α = 1, the minimal
GDoF of the common randomness to achieve any given GDoF pair (d1, d2) in the maximal secure GDoF
region D∗(1) is
d∗c(1, d1, d2) = max{d1, d2} for (d1, d2) ∈ D∗(1), α = 1.
Proof. The achievability and converse proofs are provided in Section VII and Section VIII-C, respectively.
When α = 1, Theorem 6 reveals that the minimal GDoF of the common randomness to achieve the
secure GDoF pair (d1 = 1/2, d2 = 1/2) ∈ D∗(1) is 1/2. It implies that 1/2 GDoF of common randomness
achieves the maximal secure sum GDoF 1. Without common randomness, the secure sum GDoF cannot
be more than 2/3 for the case with α = 1. Note that it is challenging to characterize d∗c(α, d1, d2) for the
general case of α. For the general case, the optimal secure GDoF region is non-symmetric in (d1, d2) as
shown in Theorem 3. To achieve the GDoF pairs in the asymmetric secure GDoF region, it might require
several converse bounds on the minimal GDoF of the common randomness, which will be studied in our
future work.
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Fig. 2. Markov chain-based interference neutralization at the receivers, for a two-user interference channel with α = 4/3.
IV. SCHEME EXAMPLE
We will here provide a scheme example, focusing on the IC-SC channel with α = 4/3 (see Section II-A).
Note that for the case of α = 4/3, without the consideration of secrecy constraints the sum GDoF is 4/3
(cf. [25]). With the consideration of secrecy constraints, the secure sum GDoF is reduced to 8/9 (cf. [12]).
In this example, we will show that by adding common randomness the secure sum GDoF can be improved
to 4/3, which matches the sum GDoF for the case without secrecy constraints. In our scheme, Markov
chain-based interference neutralization will be used in the signal design. In this scheme, the transmitted
signals are given as (without time index):
xk = vk,c +
4∑
`=1
δk,`
√
P−βu` · u
for k ∈ {1, 2}, where βu` = 13(`− 1), for ` ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; and
δj,` =
 − hiihij ·
(
h11h22
h12h21
) `
2
−1
` ∈ {2, 4}(
h11h22
h12h21
) `−1
2 ` ∈ {1, 3}
(9)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. u is the common randomness. v1,c and v2,c carry the messages of transmitters 1
and 2, respectively. The random variables v1,c, v2,c and u are independently and uniformly drawn from a
pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) set
v1,c, v2,c, u ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
Q
, Q = P
2/3−
2 )
where γ ∈ (0, 1/64] is a constant, Ω(ξ,Q),{ξa : a ∈ [−Q,Q]∩Z}, and  > 0 is a parameter that can be
made arbitrarily small. With this signal design, vk,c carries 2/3 GDoF, i.e., H(vk,c) = 2/3−2 logP+o(logP ),
with k ∈ {1, 2}. One can check that the average power constraints E|x1|2 ≤ 1 and E|x2|2 ≤ 1 are satisfied.
Then, the received signals are given as (without time index)
yk=
√
Phkkvk,c+
√
P 4/3hkjvj,c+
√
P 4/3δj,1hkju︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+
3∑
`=1
(
√
P (4−` )/3δk,`hkk+
√
P (4−` )/3δj, +`1hkj)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+δk,4hkku+zk
=
√
Phkkvk,c +
√
P 4/3hkj(vj,c + u)+δk,4hkku+zk
8for k 6= j, k, j ∈ {1, 2}. The idea of the Markov chain-based interference neutralization method is given
as follows. As shown in Fig. 2, the common randomness u is used to generate a certain number of
signals with specific directions and powers, i.e., {δ1,`
√
P−βu`u}4`=1 at transmitter 1 and {δ2,`
√
P−βu`u}4`=1
at transmitter 2; the signal δ2,1
√
P−βu1u from transmitter 2 is used to jam the information signal v2,c
at receiver 1 but it will create an interference at receiver 2; this interference will be neutralized by the
signal δ1,2
√
P−βu2u from transmitter 1; the added signal δ1,2
√
P−βu2u also creates another interference at
receiver 1 but will be neutralized by the next generated signal δ2,3
√
P−βu3u; this process repeats until the
residual interference is under the noise level. Since one signal is used to neutralize the previous signal
and will be neutralized by the next signal, it forms a Markov chain for this interference neutralization
process.
From our signal design, it can be proved that the secure rates Rk = I(vk,c; yk) − I(vk,c; yj|vj,c) ≥
2/3−
2
logP + o(logP ), k 6= j, k, j ∈ {1, 2}, and the secure sum GDoF dsum = 4/3, are achievable for
almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, by using dc = 2/3 GDoF of common randomness.
More details on the proposed scheme can be found in Section V.
V. ACHIEVABILITY FOR INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
We will here provide the achievability scheme for the symmetric Gaussian IC-SC channel (see
Section II-A). Our scheme uses PAM modulation, Markov chain-based interference neutralization and
alignment technique in the signal design. For the case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, the optimal secure sum GDoF
is achievable without adding common randomness (cf. [12], [25]). Thus, here we will just focus on the
case with α > 1/2. The scheme details are given in the following subsections.
1) Codebook generation: Transmitter k, k = 1, 2, at first generates a codebook as
Bk,
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : wk ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, w′k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}
}
(10)
where vnk denotes the corresponding codewords. The elements of the codewords are generated indepen-
dently and identically based on a particular distribution. w′k is an independent randomness that is used to
protect the confidential message, and is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, · · · , 2nR′k}. Rk and R′k are the
rates of wk and w′k, respectively. To transmit the confidential message wk, transmitter k randomly chooses
a codeword vnk from a sub-codebook Bk(wk) defined by
Bk(wk),
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : w
′
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}}, k = 1, 2 (11)
according to a uniform distribution. Then, the selected codeword vnk is mapped to the channel input based
on the following signal design
xk(t) = εvk(t) + ε
τ∑
`=1
δk,`
√
P−βu` · u(t) (12)
for k = 1, 2, where vk(t) denotes the tth element of vnk ; {δj,`}j,` are parameters that will be designed
specifically later on for different cases of α, based on the Markov chain-based interference neutralization
and alignment technique. ε is a parameter designed as
ε,
{
1 if α 6= 1
h11h22−h12h21
8
if α = 1
(13)
which is used to regularize the power of the transmitted signal. τ is a parameter designed as
τ ,

d α
1−αe if α < 1
d α
α−1e if α > 1
1 if α = 1.
(14)
9u is a random variable independently and uniformly drawn from a PAM constellation set, which will be
specified later on. For the proposed scheme, the common randomness wc is mapped into three random
variables, i.e., w′1, w
′
2 and u, such that H(wc) = H(w′1) + H(w′2) + H(u) and w′1, w′2 and u are mutually
independent. Based on our definition, w′1, w
′
2 and u are available at the transmitters but not at the receivers.
2) Signal design: For transmitter k, k = 1, 2, each element of the codeword is designed to have the
following form
vk = vk,c +
√
P−βk,pvk,p. (15)
With this, the input signal in (12) can be expressed as
xk = εvk,c + ε
√
P−βk,p · vk,p + ε
τ∑
`=1
δk,`
√
P−βu` · u, k = 1, 2 (16)
(without time index for simplicity), where random variables {vk,c, vk,p, u} are independently and uniformly
drawn from the following PAM constellation sets
vk,c, u ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
Q
, Q = P
λk,c
2 ) (17)
vk,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
2Q
, Q = P
λk,p
2 ) (18)
where γ is a parameter satisfying the constraint
γ ∈ (0, 1
τ · 2τ ].
In the proposed scheme, the designed parameters {βk,p, βu` , λk,c, λk,p, λu}k,` are given in Table I for
different regimes1. Based on the signal design in (17) and (18), we have
E|vk,c|2 =
2× ( γ
Q
)2
2Q+ 1
Q∑
i=1
i2 =
( γ
Q
)2 ·Q(Q+ 1)
3
≤ 2γ
2
3
(19)
E|u|2 ≤ 2γ
2
3
(20)
E|vk,p|2 ≤ γ
2
6
. (21)
From (13), (16) and (19)-(21), we can verify that the signal xk satisfies the power constraint, that is
E|xk|2 =ε2E|vk,c|2 + ε2P−βk,pE|vk,p|2 + ε2
( τ∑
`=1
δk,`P
−βu`
)2E|u|2
≤ε2 × 2γ
2
3
+ ε2 × γ
2
6
+ ε2 × τ 24τ × 2γ
2
3
≤1
for k = 1, 2, where γ ∈ (0, 1
τ ·2τ
]
, ε2 ≤ 1 and δk,` is designed specifically for different cases of α satisfying
the inequality ε2δ2k,` ≤ 4τ ,∀k, `, which will be shown later on.
1Without loss of generality we will take the assumption that P
λk,c
2 and P
λk,p
2 are integers, for k = 1, 2. For example, when P
λ2,c
2 isn’t
an integer, the parameter  in Table I can be slightly modified such that P
λ2,c
2 is an integer, for the regime with large P . Similar assumption
will also be used in the next channel models later.
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TABLE I
PARAMETER DESIGN FOR THE IC-SC CHANNEL.
1
2
< α ≤ 2
3
2
3
≤ α < 1 α = 1 1 < α ≤ 2 2 ≤ α
βu` , ` ∈ {1,2, · · ·,τ} (1−α)` (1−α)` 0 (α−1)(`−1) (α−1)(`−1)
β1,p, β2,p α α ∞ ∞ ∞
λ1,c, λ2,c 2α− 1−  α/2−  1/2−  α/2−  1− 
λu 2α− 1−  α/2−  1/2−  α/2−  1− 
λ1,p, λ2,p 1− α−  1− α−  0 0 0
3) Secure rate analysis: We define the rates Rk and R′k as
Rk, I(vk; yk)− I(vk; y`|v`)−  (22)
R′k, I(vk; y`|v`)−  (23)
for some  > 0, and `, k ∈ {1, 2}, ` 6= k. With our codebook and signal design, the result of [8, Theorem 2]
(or [3, Theorem 2]) suggests that the rate pair (R1, R2) defined above is achievable and the transmission
of the messages is secure, i.e., I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n and I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n. Remind that, based on our codebook
design, v1 and v2 are independent, since w1, w2, w′1, w
′
2 are mutually independent (cf. (10)).
In what follows we will show how to remove the secrecy constraints in terms of GDoF performance
by adding common randomness, focusing on the regime of α > 1/2. Specifically, we will consider the
following five cases: 2
3
≤ α < 1, 1 < α ≤ 2, α = 1, 1
2
< α ≤ 2
3
, and 2 ≤ α. In the achievability scheme,
a Markov chain-based interference neutralization method is proposed to accomplish the role of common
randomness.
A. 2/3 ≤ α < 1
In this case with 2/3 ≤ α < 1, based on the parameters designed in Table I, the transmitted signals
take the following forms
x1 =v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p +
τ∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−βu` · u (24)
x2 =v2,c +
√
P−α · v2,p +
τ∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−βu` · u (25)
where the parameters {δj,`}j,` are designed as
δj,` =

−(h12h21
h11h22
) `
2 ` ∈ {2k : 2k ≤ τ, k ∈ Z+}
hji
hjj
· (h12h21
h11h22
) `−1
2 ` ∈ {2k − 1 : 2k − 1 ≤ τ, k ∈ Z+}
(26)
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for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Note that the common randomness u is used to generate a certain number of
signals with specific directions and powers, i.e., {δ1,`
√
P−βu`u}τ`=1 at transmitter 1 and {δ2,`
√
P−βu`u}τ`=1
at transmitter 2. Then, the received signals are expressed as
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p +
√
Pαh12v2,c +
√
P 1−βu1δ1,1h11u︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+
τ−1∑
`=1
(
√
P 1−βu`+1δ1,`+1h11 +
√
Pα−βu`δ2,`h12)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ2,τh12u+ h12v2,p︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z1
=
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p +
√
Pαh12(v2,c + u) +
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ2,τh12u+ h12v2,p + z1 (27)
y2 =
√
Ph22v2,c +
√
P 1−αh22v2,p +
√
Pαh21v1,c +
√
P 1−βu1δ2,1h22u︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+
τ−1∑
`=1
(
√
P 1−βu`+1δ2,`+1h22 +
√
Pα−βu`δ1,`h21)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ1,τh21u+ h21v1,p︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z2
=
√
Ph22v2,c +
√
P 1−αh22v2,p +
√
Pαh21(v1,c + u) +
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ1,τh21u+ h21v1,p + z2. (28)
At the receivers, a Markov chain-based interference neutralization method is used to remove the
interference. In the above expressions of y1 and y2, we can see that the signal δ1,1
√
P−βu1u from transmitter
1 is used to jam the information signal v2,c at receiver 1 but it will create an interference at receiver 2;
this interference will be neutralized by the signal δ2,2
√
P−βu2u from transmitter 2; the added signal
δ2,2
√
P−βu2u also creates another interference at receiver 1 but will be neutralized by the next generated
signal δ1,3
√
P−βu3u; this process repeats until the residual interference can be treated as noise, that is,
both interference
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ2,τh12u and
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ1,τh21u can be treated as noise terms at receiver 1
and receiver 2, respectively.
Based on our signal design, we will prove that the secure rates satisfy Rk = I(vk; yk)− I(vk; y`|v`) ≥
1−α/2−2
2
logP + o(logP ), for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= `, and the secure sum GDoF dsum = 2(1 − α/2) is
achievable, for almost all the realizations of the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2. For the secure
rates described in (22), letting → 0 gives
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) (29)
R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1). (30)
Due to the symmetry we will focus on bounding the secure rate R1 (see (29)). We will use vˆ1,c and vˆ1,p
to denote the estimates for v1,c and v1,p respectively from y1, and use Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}] to
represent the error probability of this estimation. Then the term I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1)
≥I(v1; vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p) (31)
=H(v1)−H(v1|vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p)
≥H(v1)−
(
1 + Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}] ·H(v1)
)
(32)
=
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (33)
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where (31) results from the Markov chain v1 → y1 → {vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p}; (32) uses Fano’s inequality. The rates
of v1,c, v1,p and v1 = v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p are computed as
H(v1,c) = log(2 · P
α/2−
2 + 1) (34)
H(v1,p) = log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1) (35)
H(v1) =
1− α/2− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (36)
where v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ2Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) and v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
α/2−
2 ). Based on our signal design,
with vk we can reconstruct {vk,c, vk,p}, and vice versa, for k = 1, 2. To derive the lower bound of I(v1; y1),
we provide a result below.
Lemma 1. Consider the signal design in (16)-(18) and (24)-(26) for the case with 2/3 ≤ α < 1. For
almost all the channel realizations, the error probability of decoding {vk,c, vk,p} from yk is vanishing when
P goes large, that is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞, k = 1, 2. (37)
Proof. See Appendix A.
By incorporating the results of (36) and Lemma 1 into (33), the term I(v1; y1) in (29) can be lower
bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥ 1− α/2− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (38)
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2. For the term I(v1; y2|v2) in (29), we can treat it
as a rate penalty. This penalty can be bounded by
I(v1; y2|v2)
≤I(v1; y2, v1,c + u|v2) (39)
=I(v1; v1,c + u) + I(v1;
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ1,τh21u+ h21v1,p + z2|v2, v1,c + u) (40)
≤ H(v1,c + u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤log(4·P
α/2−
2 +1)
− H(u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=log(2·P
α/2−
2 +1)
+ h(
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ1,τh21u+ h21v1,p + z2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 1
2
log(2pie(4τ+1+5))
− h(
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ1,τh21u+ h21v1,p + z2|v2, v1,c + u, v1, u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h(z2)
(41)
≤ log(4P α/2−2 + 1)− log(2P α/2−2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
+
1
2
log(2pie(4τ+1 + 5))− 1
2
log(2pie) (42)
≤1 + 1
2
log(4τ+1 + 5)
= log(2
√
4τ+1 + 5) (43)
where (40) follows from the fact that v1, v2, u are mutually independent; (41) stems from the fact that
{vk,p, vk,c} can be reconstructed from vk for k = 1, 2, and the identity that adding a condition will not
increase the differential entropy; (42) results from the derivations that H(v1,c+u) ≤ log(4P α/2−2 +1), and
that h(
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ1,τh21u+h21v1,p+z2) ≤ 12 log(2pie(P (τ+1)α−τδ21,τ ·|h21|2 ·E|u|2 +|h21|2 ·E|v1,p|2 +1)) ≤
1
2
log(2pie(4τ×4+4+1)). In this case with 2/3 ≤ α < 1, P (τ+1)α−τ = P d α1−α e(α−1)+α ≤ P α1−α (α−1)+α = 1,
and δ2k,` ≤ 4τ ,∀k, `. With (38) and (43), we have
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ 1− α/2− 2
2
logP + o(logP )
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and also R2 ≥ 1−α/2−22 logP + o(logP ) resulting from symmetry, for almost all the channel realizations.
It suggests that the proposed scheme achieves dsum = 2(1 − α/2) for almost all the channel realizations
by using dc = α/2 GDoF of common randomness. Note that in our scheme the common randomness is
mapped into three random variables, i.e., w′1, w
′
2 and u. In this case, the rate of w
′
1 is R
′
1 = I(v1; y2|v2)− ≤
o(logP )−  (see (23) and (43)); the rate of w′2 is R′2 = I(v2; y1|v1)−  ≤ o(logP )− ; and the rate of u
is H(u) = log(2 · P λu2 + 1) = λu
2
logP + o(logP ), which gives dc = λu = α/2 when → 0.
B. 1 < α ≤ 2
In this case with 1 < α ≤ 2, based on the parameters designed in Table I, the transmitted signals take
the forms as
x1 =v1,c +
τ∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−βu` · u (44)
x2 =v2,c +
τ∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−βu` · u (45)
where in this case the parameters {δj,`}j,` are designed as
δj,` =

− hii
hij
· (h11h22
h12h21
) `
2
−1
` ∈ {2k : 2k ≤ τ, k ∈ Z+}
(
h11h22
h12h21
) `−1
2 ` ∈ {2k − 1 : 2k − 1 ≤ τ, k ∈ Z+}
(46)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Similarly to the previous case, the common randomness u is used to generate a
certain number of signals with specific directions and powers. Then, the received signals are given as
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
Pαh12v2,c +
√
Pα−βu1δ2,1h12u︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+
τ−1∑
`=1
(
√
P 1−βu`δ1,`h11 +
√
Pα−βu`+1δ2,`+1h12)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+
√
P τ−(τ−1)αδ1,τh11u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z1
=
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
Pαh12(v2,c + u) +
√
P τ−(τ−1)αδ1,τh11u+ z1 (47)
y2 =
√
Ph22v2,c + +
√
Pαh21v1,c +
√
Pα−βu1δ1,1h21u︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+
τ−1∑
`=1
(
√
P 1−βu`δ2,`h22 +
√
Pα−βu`+1δ1,`+1h21)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+
√
P τ−(τ−1)αδ2,τh22u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z2
=
√
Ph22v2,c +
√
Pαh21(v1,c + u) +
√
P τ−(τ−1)αδ2,τh22u+ z2. (48)
As can be seen from the above expressions of y1 and y2, the interference can be removed by using the
Markov chain-based interference neutralization method. In the end, the interference
√
P τ−(τ−1)αδ1,τh11u
and the interference
√
P τ−(τ−1)αδ2,τh22u can be treated as the noise terms at receiver 1 and receiver 2,
respectively. Based on our signal design, we will prove that the secure rates satisfy Rk = I(vk; yk) −
I(vk; y`|v`) ≥ α/2−2 logP + o(logP ), k 6= `, k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, and the secure sum GDoF dsum = α is
achievable, for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2.
Due to the symmetry we will focus on bounding the secure rate R1 (see (29)). Let vˆ1,c be the estimate
for v1,c from y1, and let Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c}] denote the corresponding error probability for this estimation.
By following the proof steps of Lemma 1, in this case with 1 < α ≤ 2 one can prove that
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞ (49)
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for almost all the realizations of the channel coefficients. With v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
α/2−
2 ) and
v1 = v1,c, the rate of v1 is computed as
H(v1) = H(v1,c) = log(2 · P
α/2−
2 + 1) (50)
and then, I(v1; y1) can be bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]
)
H(v1)− 1 (51)
=
α/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (52)
for almost all the realizations of the channel coefficients, where (51) is derived by following the steps in
(31)-(33); and (52) uses the results of (49) and (50). For the term I(v1; y2|v2) in (29), by following the
steps in (39)-(43) it can be bounded as
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ o(logP ). (53)
From (52) and (53), we have
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ α/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (54)
and also R2 ≥ α/2−2 logP + o(logP ) resulting from symmetry, for almost all the channel realizations.
By letting  → 0, the proposed scheme achieves dsum = α for almost all channel realizations by using
dc = α/2 GDoF of common randomness.
C. α = 1
In this case with α = 1, based on the parameters designed in Table I, and by setting
δ1,1 =
h22h12 − h12h21
h11h22 − h12h21 , δ2,1 =
h11h21 − h21h12
h22h11 − h21h12 , (55)
the transmitted signals take the following forms
x1 =εv1,c + ε
h22h12 − h12h21
h11h22 − h12h21 · u (56)
x2 =εv2,c + ε
h11h21 − h21h12
h22h11 − h21h12 · u. (57)
Note that in this case, τ = 1 and ε = h11h22−h12h21
8
. Then, the received signals are simplified as
y1 = ε
√
Ph11v1,c + ε
√
Ph12 (v2,c + u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+z1 (58)
y2 = ε
√
Ph22v2,c + ε
√
Ph21 (v1,c + u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+z2. (59)
From the previous steps in (31)-(38), for almost all the realizations of the channel coefficients, the term
I(v1; y1) in (29) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥ 1/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (60)
From the derivations in (39)-(43), the term I(v1; y2|v2) in (29) can be upper bounded by
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ o(logP ). (61)
With (60) and (61), we have the following bounds on the secure rates
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ 1/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (62)
and R2 ≥ 1/2−2 logP + o(logP ) (due to the symmetry), for almost all channel realizations. By letting
 → 0, the proposed scheme achieves dsum = 1 for almost all channel realizations by using dc = 1/2
GDoF of common randomness.
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D. 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3
When 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, the signals of the transmitters have the same forms as in (24) and (25), and
the parameters {δj,`}j,` are designed as in (26). Since τ = 2 for this case, the transmitted signals can be
simplified as
x1 =v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p +
(√
Pα−1 · h12
h11
−
√
P 2α−2 · h12h21
h11h22
)
u (63)
x2 =v2,c +
√
P−α · v2,p +
(√
Pα−1 · h21
h22
−
√
P 2α−2 · h21h12
h22h11
)
u. (64)
The received signals then take the following forms
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p +
√
Pαh12 (v2,c + u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+h12v2,p −
√
P 3α−2 · h
2
12h21
h11h22
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z1 (65)
y2 =
√
Ph22v2,c +
√
P 1−αh22v2,p +
√
Pαh21 (v1,c + u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+h21v1,p −
√
P 3α−2 · h
2
21h12
h22h11
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z2. (66)
In the above expressions of y1 and y2, the interference is removed by using the Markov chain-based
interference neutralization method.
We will focus on bounding the secure rate R1. By following the derivations in (31)-(33), the term
I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (67)
where the rate of v1 in (67) is
H(v1) = H(v1,c) +H(v1,p) =
α− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (68)
and the error probability in (67) is vanishing, stated below.
Lemma 2. With (16)-(18) and (63)-(64) and for 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, the error probability of decoding
{vk,c, vk,p} from yk is vanishing when P goes large, that is,
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞, k = 1, 2. (69)
Proof. See Appendix B.
From (67), (68) and Lemma 2, the term I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥ α− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (70)
From the derivations in (39)-(43), the term I(v1; y2|v2) in (29) is bounded by
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ o(logP ). (71)
With (70) and (71), we conclude that
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ α− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (72)
and also R2 ≥ α−22 logP +o(logP ), which imply that the proposed scheme achieves dsum = 2α, by using
dc = 2α− 1 GDoF of common randomness.
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E. α ≥ 2
When α ≥ 2, the signals of the transmitters have the same forms as in (44) and (45), and the parameters
{δj,`}j,` are designed as in (46). Since τ = 2 for this case, the transmitted signals can be simplified as
x1 =v1,c +
(
1−
√
P 1−α · h22
h21
)
u (73)
x2 =v2,c +
(
1−
√
P 1−α · h11
h12
)
u (74)
and the received signals can be simplified as
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
Pαh12 (v2,c + u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
−
√
P 2−α · h22h11
h21
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z1 (75)
y2 =
√
Ph22v2,c +
√
Pαh21 (v1,c + u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
−
√
P 2−α · h11h22
h12
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z2. (76)
By following the proof steps of Lemma 2, the error probability for the estimation of vk,c from yk,
k = 1, 2, is proved to be vanishing, that is, Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c] → 0 as P → ∞. Given that v1 = v1,c and
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
1−
2 ), the rate of v1 is H(v1) = H(v1,c) = log(2 ·P 1−2 + 1). At this point, the term
I(v1; y1) in (29) is bounded as
I(v1; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]
) ·H(v1)− 1
=
1− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (77)
Furthermore, from (39)-(43) we can derive the upper bound of I(v1; y2|v2) in (29) as
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ o(logP ). (78)
With (77) and (78), the following bounds hold true:
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ 1− 
2
logP + o(logP )
and R2 ≥ 1−2 logP + o(logP ), which suggest that the proposed scheme achieves dsum = 2 by using
dc = 1 GDoF of common randomness.
VI. ACHIEVABILITY FOR WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH A HELPER
In this section, we provide the achievability scheme for a Gaussian WTH channel (see Section II-B). The
proposed scheme uses PAM modulation, Markov chain-based interference neutralization and alignment
technique in the signal design. For the case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, the optimal secure sum GDoF d∗(α) = 1
is achievable without adding common randomness (cf. [19]). Therefore, here we will just focus on the
case with α > 1/2 and prove that d(α) = 1 is achievable. The scheme details are given as follows.
1) Codebook generation: The codebook generation is similar to the previous case for the interference
channel with confidential messages, with one difference being that only transmitter 1 is required to generate
the codebook in this channel. Note that in this channel transmitter 2 will act as a helper without sending
message. For transmitter 1, it generates a codebook given by
B,
{
vn(w1, w
′
1) : w1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , 2nR1}, w′1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , 2nR
′
1}
}
(79)
which is similar to that in (10). To transmit the confidential message w1, transmitter 1 chooses a codeword
vn randomly from a sub-codebook B(w1) defined by
B(w1),
{
vn(w1, w
′
1) : w
′
1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
1}}
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according to a uniform distribution (similar to (11)). Then the selected codeword vn is mapped to the
channel input under the following signal design
x1(t) = εv(t) + ε
τ∑
`=0
δ1,`
√
P−βu` · u(t) (80)
where {δk,`}k,` are the parameters which will be specified later by using the Markov chain-based
interference neutralization and alignment technique. ε is a parameter designed as
ε,
{
1 if α 6= 1
h11h22−h12h21
8
if α = 1.
(81)
τ is another parameter designed as
τ ,

1 if α = 1⌈
1
2(1−α)
⌉
if α < 1⌈
1
2(α−1)
⌉
if α > 1.
(82)
u is a random variable independently and uniformly drawn from a PAM constellation set which will be
specified later on. In this channel, the common randomness wc is mapped into two random variables,
i.e., w′1 and u, such that H(wc) = H(w′1) +H(u) and w′1 and u are mutually independent. Based on our
definition, w′1 and u are available at the transmitters but not at the receivers.
2) Signal design: In the scheme, each element of the codeword vn in (79) is designed to take the
following form
v(t) = vc(t) +
√
P−βp · vp(t) (83)
which gives the channel input in (80) as
x1 = εvc + ε
√
P−βp · vp + ε
τ∑
`=0
δ1,`
√
P−βu` · u (84)
(removing the time index for simplicity). At transmitter 2, it sends the jamming signal designed as
x2 = ε
τ∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β
′
u` · u (85)
where the random variables u, vc and vp are independently and uniformly drawn from the corresponding
PAM constellation sets
vc, u ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
Q
, Q = P
λc
2 ) (86)
vp ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
2Q
, Q = P
λp
2 ) (87)
and γ is a parameter satisfying the constraint
γ ∈ (0, 1
(τ + 2) · 4τ
]
. (88)
Table II provides the designed parameters {βp, βu` , β′u` , λc, λp, λu} under different regimes. Based on our
signal design (see (86)-(87)), and by following the steps in (19)-(21) we have
E|vc|2 = E|u|2 ≤ 2γ
2
3
and E|vp|2 ≤ γ
2
6
. (89)
By combining (84), (85) and (89), one can check that the power constraints E|x1|2 ≤ 1 and E|x2|2 ≤ 1
are satisfied.
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TABLE II
PARAMETER DESIGN FOR THE WTH CHANNEL.
1/2 < α < 1 α = 1 α > 1
βu0 ∞ ∞ 0
βu` , ` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , τ − 1} 2`(1− α) 0 2`(α− 1)
βuτ ∞ 0 2τ(α− 1)
β′u` , ` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , τ} (2`− 1)(1− α) 0 (2`− 1)(α− 1)
βp α ∞ ∞
λc α−  1−  1− 
λp 1− α−  0 0
λu α−  1−  1− 
3) Secure rate analysis: We define the rates R1 and R′1 as
R1, I(v; y1)− I(v; y2)−  (90)
R′1, I(v; y2)− . (91)
With our codebook and signal design, the result of [8, Theorem 2] (or [3, Theorem 2]) suggests that the rate
R1 defined in (90) is achievable and the transmission of the message w1 is secure, that is, I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n.
For this WTH channel, it can be treated as a particular case of the IC-SC channel if we remove the second
transmitter’s message (or set it empty). Thus, the result of [8, Theorem 2] (or [3, Theorem 2]) derived
for the IC-SC channel reveals that the secure rate R1 defined in (90) is achievable in this WTH channel.
In what follows we will provide the rate analysis, focusing on the regime of α > 1/2. Specifically, we
will consider the following three cases: 1
2
< α < 1, α > 1 and α = 1. In the achievability scheme, a
Markov chain-based interference neutralization method is proposed.
A. 1/2 < α < 1
When 1/2 < α < 1, the parameters {δk,`}k,` are designed as
δ1,` = −
(h12h21
h11h22
)`
` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , τ − 1}
δ2,` =
h21
h22
· (h12h21
h11h22
)`−1
` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , τ}.
In this case, the transmitted signals take the forms as
x1 =vc +
√
P−α · vp +
τ−1∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−βu` · u (92)
x2 =
τ∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β
′
u` · u. (93)
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Note that the common randomness u is used to generate a certain number of signals with specific directions
and powers, i.e., {δ1,`
√
P−βu`u}τ`=0 at transmitter 1 and {δ2,`
√
P−β
′
u`u}τ`=1 at transmitter 2. Then, the
received signals are expressed as
y1 =
√
Ph11vc +
√
P 1−αh11vp +
τ−1∑
`=1
(
√
P 1−βu`δ1,`h11+
√
Pα−β
′
u`δ2,`h12)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+
√
P 2τα+1−2τδ2,τh12u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z1
=
√
Ph11vc +
√
P 1−αh11vp +
√
P 2τα+1−2τδ2,τh12u+ z1 (94)
y2 =
√
Pαh21vc +
√
P 1−β
′
u1δ2,1h22u︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+h21vp +
τ−1∑
`=1
(
√
Pα−βu`δ1,`h21 +
√
P
1−β′u`+1δ2,`+1h22)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+z2
=
√
Pαh21(vc + u) + h21vp + z2. (95)
At the receivers, a Markov chain-based interference neutralization method is used to remove the
interference. In the above expressions of y1 and y2, we can see that the signal δ2,1
√
P−β
′
u1u from
transmitter 2 is used to jam the information signal vc at receiver 2 but it will create an interference
at receiver 1; this interference will be neutralized by the signal δ1,1
√
P−βu1u from transmitter 1; the
added signal δ1,1
√
P−βu1u also creates another signal at receiver 2 but will be neutralized by the next
generated signal δ2,2
√
P−β
′
u2u; this process repeats until the residual interference can be treated as noise.
For the proposed scheme, the rate R1 defined in (90) can be achieved, which can be expressed as
R1 = I(v; y1)− I(v; y2) (96)
for  → 0. In the following we will bound the secure rate R1. Let vˆc and vˆp be the estimates of vc and
vp respectively from y1, and let Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}] denote the corresponding error probability of
this estimation. With this, the term I(v; y1) in (96) has the following bound
I(v; y1) ≥ I(v; vˆc, vˆp) (97)
= H(v)−H(v|vˆc, vˆp)
≥ H(v)− (1 + Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}] ·H(v)) (98)
=
(
1− Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]
) ·H(v)− 1 (99)
where (97) stems from the Markov property of v → y1 → {vˆc, vˆp}; and (98) stems from Fano’s inequality.
Given that vc ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
α−
2 ) and vp ∈ Ω(ξ = γ2Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ), we have
H(v) = H(vc) +H(vp)
= log(2 · P α−2 + 1) + log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1)
=
1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (100)
Note that, with our signal design, we can construct {vc, vp} based on v, and vice versa. Below we have
a result on the error probability appeared in (99).
Lemma 3. With design in (84)-(87) and Table II, for 1/2 < α < 1, the error probability of decoding
{vc, vp} based on y1 is vanishing when P is large, i.e.,
Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]→ 0 as P →∞. (101)
Proof. See Appendix C.
By incorporating the results of Lemma 3 and (100) into (99), it gives
I(v; y1) ≥ 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (102)
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For the last term appeared in (96), we can treat it as a rate penalty. This penalty can be bounded by
I(v; y2) ≤I(v; y2, vc + u)
=I(v; vc + u) + I(v;h21vp + z2|vc + u) (103)
=H(vc + u)−H(u) + h(h21vp + z2)− h(z2)
≤ log(4 · P α−2 + 1)− log(2 · P α−2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
+
1
2
log(2pie(|h21|2 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤5
))− 1
2
log(2pie) (104)
≤ log(2
√
5) (105)
where (104) uses an identity that vc + u ∈ Ω(ξ = γ ·P−α−2 , Q = 2 ·P α−2 ). Finally, by incorporating the
results of (102) and (105) into (96), we have
R1 ≥ 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (106)
which suggests that when 1/2 < α < 1 the proposed scheme achieves d(α) = 1 by using dc = α GDoF
of common randomness (mainly due to u, and dc = λu = α−  with → 0).
B. α > 1
In this case with α > 1, the parameters {δk,`}k,` are designed as
δ1,` =
(h11h22
h12h21
)`
` ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , τ} (107)
δ2,` = −h11
h12
· (h11h22
h12h21
)`−1
` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , τ}. (108)
The transmitted signals in this case have the following expressions
x1 =vc +
τ∑
`=0
δ1,`
√
P−βu` · u (109)
x2 =
τ∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β
′
u` · u. (110)
Similarly to the previous case, the common randomness u is used to generate a certain number of signals
with specific directions and powers. Then, the received signals are expressed as
y1 =
√
Ph11vc +
τ−1∑
`=0
(
√
P 1−βu`δ1,`h11 +
√
P
α−β′u`+1δ2,`+1h12)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+
√
P−2τα+2τ+1δ1,τh11u︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as noise
+z1
=
√
Ph11vc +
√
P−2τα+2τ+1δ1,τh11u+ z1 (111)
y2 =
√
Pαh21vc +
√
Pα−βu0δ1,0h21u︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+
τ∑
`=1
(
√
Pα−βu`δ1,`h21 +
√
P 1−β
′
u`δ2,`h22)u︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
+z2
=
√
Pαh21(vc + u) + z2. (112)
At the receivers, a Markov chain-based interference neutralization method is used to remove the
interference. From the expression of (111), we can estimate vc from y1 by treating the other signal
as noise. Note that in this case vc ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
1−
2 ), and the term
√
P−2τα+2τ+1δ1,τh11u in (111)
can be treated as noise because |√P−2τα+2τ+1δ1,τh11u| ≤ 4τ × 2 × γ ≤ 4α−44α−3 , recalling that |u| ≤ γ
(cf. (86)), γ ∈ (0, 1
(τ+2)4τ
] (cf. (88)) and |δ1,τ | ≤ 4τ (cf. (107)). Therefore, by treating the other signal
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as noise, one can easily prove that the error probability of decoding vc from y1 is vanishing when P is
large, that is,
Pr[vc 6= vˆc]→ 0 as P →∞ (113)
where vˆc is the estimate of vc.
Note that the rate of v is computed as H(v) = H(vc) = 1−2 logP + o(logP ). From (97)-(99), we can
bound I(v; y1) appeared in (96) as
I(v; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{vc 6= vˆc}]
) ·H(v)− 1
=
(
1− Pr[{vc 6= vˆc}]
) · 1− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (114)
With (113) and (114), it gives
I(v; y1) ≥ 1− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (115)
From (103)-(105), we can also bound I(v; y2) in (96) as
I(v; y2) ≤ o(logP ). (116)
Given (115) and (116), we have
R1 ≥ 1− 
2
logP + o(logP ).
This suggests that, when α > 1, the proposed scheme achieves d(α) = 1 by using dc = 1 GDoF of
common randomness.
C. α = 1
When α = 1, by setting
δ1,1 = − h12h21
h11h22 − h12h21 , δ2,1 =
h11h21
h11h22 − h12h21 ,
the transmitted signals take the following forms
x1 =εvc − ε h12h21
h11h22 − h12h21 · u (117)
x2 =ε
h11h21
h11h22 − h12h21 · u. (118)
Note that in this case, τ = 1 and ε = h11h22−h12h21
8
. Then, the received signals are expressed as
y1 = ε
√
Ph11vc + z1 (119)
y2 = ε
√
Ph21(vc + u) + z2. (120)
Let us consider the bound of the secure rate R1 expressed in (96). In this case, the rate of v is computed
as H(v) = H(vc) = 1−2 logP +o(logP ). By following the steps in (97)-(102), I(v; y1) in (96) is bounded
by
I(v; y1) ≥ 1− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (121)
From (103)-(105), we can also bound I(v; y2) in (96) as
I(v; y2) ≤ 1. (122)
At this point, given (121) and (122), we have R1 ≥ 1−2 logP + o(logP ). This bound suggests that, when
α = 1, the proposed scheme achieves d(α) = 1 by using dc = 1 GDoF of common randomness.
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VII. ACHIEVABILITY FOR MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we will provide the achievability proof of Theorem 3 for MAC-WT channel defined in
Section II-C. The following lemma will be used in the proof.
Lemma 4. Given the symmetric Gaussian MAC-WT channel defined in Section II-C, for any tuple
(d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
c) such that (d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
c) ∈ D¯(α), then
(
1
α
d
′
2,
1
α
d
′
1,
1
α
d
′
c) ∈ D¯(
1
α
). (123)
Proof. See Appendix D.
In what follows, we will first focus on the case of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and prove that the optimal secure GDoF
region D∗(α) = {(d1, d2)|d1 + d2 ≤ max{1, α}, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ α} is achievable for the 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
case2. In Section VII-C, we will prove that D∗(α) is achievable for α > 1 by using the result of Lemma 4.
In the proposed scheme, pulse amplitude modulation, Markov chain-based interference neutralization and
alignment technique will be used in the signal design. The details of the proposed scheme are given as
follows.
1) Codebook: The codebook generation is the same as that of the interference channel in Section V
(see (10) and (11)). In this setting, the channel input takes the following form
xk(t) = εvk(t) + ε
τ/2∑
`=1
δk,`
√
P−β1,k,` · u1(t) + ε
τ/2∑
`=1
δk,`
√
P−β2,k,` · u2(t) (124)
for k = 1, 2, where vk(t) denotes the tth element of codeword; {δk,`}k,` and τ are parameters that will be
designed specifically later on for different cases of α; ε is a parameter designed as
ε,
{
1 if α 6= 1
h11h22−h12h21
8
if α = 1.
(125)
2) PAM constellation and signal alignment: In this setting, all the elements of the codewords are
designed to take the following forms (without time index) for transmitter 1 and transmitter 2, respectively,
v1 = v1,c +
√
P−β1,pv1,p (126)
v2 =
√
P−β2,c
h21
h22
v2,c +
√
P−β2,m
h21
h22
v2,m. (127)
Then, we can rewrite the channel input in (124) as
x1 =εv1,c + ε
√
P−β1,pv1,p + ε
τ/2∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−β1,1,` · u1 + ε
τ/2∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−β2,1,` · u2 (128)
x2 =ε
√
P−β2,c
h21
h22
v2,c + ε
√
P−β2,m
h21
h22
v2,m + ε
τ/2∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β1,2,` · u1 + ε
τ/2∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β2,2,` · u2 (129)
2When α = 0, D(0) = {(d1, d2)|0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1, d2 = 0} is achievable by using a single-user transmission scheme. Therefore, without loss
of generality, we will focus on the case with α > 0.
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where the random variables {vk,c, v1,p, v2,m, uk}k=1,2 are independent and uniformly drawn from the PAM
constellation sets
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η1,cγ
Q
, Q = P
λ1,c
2 ) (130)
v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
2Q
, Q = P
λ1,p
2 ) (131)
v2,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η2,cγ
Q
, Q = P
λ2,c
2 ) (132)
u1 ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
Q
, Q = P
max{λ1,c,λ2,c}
2 ) (133)
v2,m, u2 ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
2Q
, Q = P
λ2,m
2 ) (134)
respectively, where γ ∈ (0, 1
τ ·2τ ]. The parameters {λk,c, λ1,p, λ2,m, β2,c, β1,p, β2,m, β1,k,`, β2,k,`}k,` are
designed as in Table III. Note that B is a parameter within a specific range, which will be specified
later on for different cases of α. The parameters η1,c and η2,c are designed to ensure that v1,c and v2,c have
a certain integer relationship on the minimum distances of their PAM constellation sets3. Specifically, η1,c
and η2,c are designed as
ηim,c = 1, ηin,c =
⌈√
P λim,c−λin,c
⌉/√
P λim,c−λin,c (135)
where im = arg max
i∈{1,2}
λi,c, in 6= im, im, in ∈ {1, 2}. (136)
With this design, the ratio of the minimum distance of the constellation for vin,c and the minimum distance
of the constellation for vim,c, i.e.,
ηin,cγ
P
λin,c
2
/ ηim,cγ
P
λim,c
2
, is an integer, where 1 ≤ ηin,c < 2. By following the
steps in (19)-(21), it is easy to check that the average power constraints E|x1|2 ≤ 1 and E|x2|2 ≤ 1 are
satisfied. In our scheme, the parameter τ is designed as
τ ,
{
2
⌈
max
{⌈
α
1−α
⌉
,
⌈
1−α+B
1−α
⌉}
/2
⌉
if α 6= 1
2 if α = 1.
(137)
The parameters {δk,`}k,` are designed as
δ1,`,
{
−(h12h21
h11h22
)`
if α 6= 1
− h12h21
h11h22−h12h21 if α = 1
(138)
and
δ2,`,
{
h21
h22
· (h12h21
h11h22
)`−1
if α 6= 1
h11h21
h11h22−h12h21 if α = 1
(139)
for ` ∈ {1, 2, · · · τ/2}.
3) Secure rate analysis: Given the codebook design and signal mapping, the result of [27, Theorem 1]
implies that we can achieve the following secure rate region{
(R1, R2) :
2∑
k=1
Rk ≤
(
I(v1, v2; y1)− I(v1, v2; y2)
)+
, R1 ≤ I(v1; y1|v2), R2 ≤ I(v2; y1|v1)
}
. (140)
In the following subsections we will provide the analysis of the rate region under three different cases,
i.e., 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
, 2
3
≤ α < 1 and α = 1. In the proposed scheme, a Markov chain-based interference
neutralization method is used.
3For a PAM constellation set defined as Ω(ξ,Q),{ξa : a ∈ [−Q,Q] ∩ Z}, the minimum distance of the constellation is ξ.
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TABLE III
DESIGNED PARAMETERS FOR MAC-WT CHANNEL WHEN α ≤ 1. THE LAST TWO ROWS CORRESPOND TO THE DESIGN OF THE
PARAMETERS β1,k,` AND β2,k,` , FOR k ∈ {1, 2} AND ` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , τ2 }.
0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
2
3
≤ α < 1 α = 1
0 ≤ B ≤ (2α−1)+ (2α−1)+ < B ≤ α 0 ≤ B ≤ 2α− 1 2α−1 < B ≤ α (d′1, d
′
2)∈D∗(1)
β2,c 1− α 1− α 1− α 1− α 0
β2,m ∞ α−B ∞ α−B ∞
β1,p α α α ∞ ∞
λ2,c B −  (2α− 1)+ −  B −  2α− 1−  d′2 − 
λ2,m 0 B − (2α− 1)+ −  0 B−2α+1− 0
λ1,p 1−α−B− (max{B, 1−α}−B−)+ min{1−α, 2α−1−B}− 0 0
λ1,c α−  (1−B − λ1,p)+ − 2 (1−B − λ1,p)+ − 2 1−B −  d′1 − 
β2,k,` ∞ β1,k,`−(1 +B − 2α) ∞ β1,k,`−(1+B−2α) ∞
β1,k,` (2`− k + 1)(1− α) 0
A. 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
For this case of 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
, we will divide the analysis into two cases and show that the secure GDoF
region D∗(α) is achievable.
1) 0 ≤ B ≤ (2α− 1)+: In the case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and 0 ≤ B ≤ (2α− 1)+, based on the parameter
design in (128)-(139) and Table III, the transmitted signals take the following forms
x1 =v1,c +
√
P−αv1,p +
τ/2∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−β1,1,` · u1 (141)
x2 =
√
Pα−1
h21
h22
v2,c +
τ/2∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β1,2,` · u1. (142)
Then the received signals take the forms as
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c+
√
P 2α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,c+
√
P 1−αh11v1,p+
τ/2∑
`=1
(
√
P 1−β1,1,`δ1,`h11+
√
Pα−β1,2,`δ2,`h12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
u1+z1
=
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 2α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,c +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p + z1, (143)
y2 =
√
Pαh21v1,c +
√
Pαh21v2,c +
√
P 1−β1,2,1h22δ2,1u1︸ ︷︷ ︸
aligned
+
τ
2
−1∑
`=1
(
√
Pα−β1,1,`δ1,`h21 +
√
P 1−β1,2,`+1δ2,`+1h22)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference neutralization
u1 +
√
Pα−β1,1,τ/2δ1,τ/2h21u1 + h12v1,p + z2
=
√
Pαh21(v1,c + v2,c + u1) +
√
Pα−β1,1,τ/2δ1,τ/2h21u1 + h12v1,p + z2. (144)
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In the above expressions of y1 and y2, the interference is removed by using the Markov chain-based
interference neutralization method. For the secure rate region in (140), we will prove that I(v1, v2; y1)−
I(v1, v2; y2) ≥ 1−32 logP+o(logP ), I(v1; y1|v2) ≥ 1−B−22 logP+o(logP ) and I(v2; y1|v1) ≥ B−2 logP+
o(logP ), which will imply that the GDoF region {(d1, d2)|d1 + d2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1−B, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ B} is
achievable, for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2.
First we focus on the lower bound of I(v1, v2; y1)− I(v1, v2; y2). Let vˆ1,c, vˆ2,c and vˆ1,p be the estimates
of v1,c, v2,c and v1,p from y1, respectively, Let Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}] denote the
corresponding error probability of this estimation. Then the term I(v1, v2; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1, v2; y1) ≥ I(v1, v2; vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p, vˆ2,c) (145)
= H(v1, v2)−H(v1, v2|vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p, vˆ2,c)
≥ H(v1, v2)− (1 + Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]) ·H(v1, v2) (146)
≥ (1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]) ·H(v1, v2)− 1 (147)
where (145) results from the Markov chain {v1, v2} → y1 → {vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p, vˆ2,c}; (146) uses Fano’s inequality.
For the term H(v1, v2) appeared in (147) we have
H(v1, v2) = H(v1,c) +H(v1,p) +H(v2,c) =
1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ). (148)
Below we provide a result on the error probability appeared in (147).
Lemma 5. When 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and 0 ≤ B ≤ (2α − 1)+, given the signal design in Table III, (130)-(134)
and (141)-(142), for almost all the channel realizations the error probability of decoding {v1,c, v1,p, v2,c}
from y1 is vanishing when P goes large, i.e.,
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]→ 0 as P →∞. (149)
Proof. See Appendix E.
With the results of (147), (148) and Lemma 5, we can bound the term I(v1, v2; y1) as
I(v1, v2; y1) ≥ 1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ) (150)
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2. For the term I(v1, v2; y2), we can bound it as
I(v1, v2; y2)
≤ I(v1, v2; y2, v1,c + v2,c + u1) (151)
= I(v1, v2; v1,c + v2,c + u1) + I(v1, v2; y2|v1,c + v2,c + u1)
≤ H(v1,c + v2,c + u1)−H(u1) + h(
√
Pα−β1,1,τ/2δ1,τ/2h21u1 + h12v1,p + z2)− h(z2) (152)
≤ log(6Q′ + 1)− log(2Q′ + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤log 3
+
1
2
log
(
2pie(
8
3τ 2
+
2
3τ 2 · 4τ + 1)
)− 1
2
log(2pie) (153)
≤ log
(
3
√
8
3τ 2
+
2
3τ 2 · 4τ + 1
)
(154)
where (152) follows from the fact that {v1,c, v2,c, u1} are mutually independent; (153) stems from the
derivation that H(v1,c + v2,c + u1) ≤ log(6Q′ + 1) and H(u1) = log(2Q′ + 1), where Q′,P
max{λ1,c,λ2,c}
2 .
Due to our design in (135)-(136), the ratio between the minimum distance of the constellation for v2,c
and the minimum distance of the constellation for v1,c is an integer. This integer relationship allows us
to minimize the value of H(v1,c + v2,c + u1), which can be treated as a GDoF penalty.
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Given the results of (150) and (154), it reveals that
I(v1, v2; y1)− I(v1, v2; y2) ≥ 1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ) (155)
for almost all the channel realizations. Now we consider the bound of I(v1; y1|v2). Let
y
′
1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p + z1 (156)
and let {vˆ′1,c, vˆ′1,p} be the estimates of {v1,c, v1,p} from y′1. Then we have
I(v1; y1|v2) = I(v1, y′1) (157)
≥ (1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ′1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ′1,p}]) ·H(v1)− 1 (158)
where (157) follows from the independence between v2 and v1; (158) follows from the steps in (145)-(147).
For the term H(v1) appeared in (158), we have
H(v1) =
1−B − 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (159)
By following the proof steps of Lemma 3, one can easily prove that error probability of estimating v1,c
and v1,p based on y′1 is vanishing when P goes large, that is,
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ′1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ
′
1,p}]→ 0 as P →∞. (160)
With (158), (159) and (160), it suggests that
I(v1; y1|v2) ≥ 1−B − 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (161)
Similarly, I(v2; y1|v1) can be bounded by
I(v2; y1|v1) ≥ B − 
2
logP + o(logP ). (162)
By combining the results of (140), (155), (161) and (162), it implies that the GDoF region {(d1, d2)|d1 +
d2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1− B, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ B} is achievable for almost all the channel coefficients, for this case
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and 0 ≤ B ≤ (2α− 1)+.
2) (2α− 1)+ < B ≤ α: In the case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and (2α− 1)+ < B ≤ α, the transmitted signals
now take the following forms
x1 =v1,c +
√
P−αv1,p +
τ/2∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−β1,1,` · (u1 +√P 1+B−2α · u2) (163)
x2 =
√
Pα−1
h21
h22
v2,c +
√
PB−α
h21
h22
v2,m +
τ/2∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β1,2,` · (u1 +√P 1+B−2α · u2) (164)
and the received signals take the following forms
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 2α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,c +
√
PB
h12h21
h22
v2,m +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p + z1 (165)
y2 =
√
Pαh21(v1,c + v2,c + u1) +
√
PB+1−αh21(v2,m + u2)
+
√
Pα−β1,1,τ/2δ1,τ/2h21u1 +
√
PB+1−α−β1,1,τ/2δ1,τ/2h21u2 + h12v1,p + z2. (166)
By following the derivations in (145)-(147), the term I(v1, v2; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1, v2; y1) ≥
(
1−Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c} ∪ {v2,m 6= vˆ2,m}]
)·H(v1, v2)−1 (167)
=
1− 4
2
logP + o(logP ). (168)
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where the step in (167) derives from (145)-(147); and the last step follows from Lemma 6 (see below)
and the fact that H(v1, v2) = H(v1,c) +H(v1,p) +H(v2,c) +H(v2,m) = 1−42 logP + o(logP ).
Lemma 6. When 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and (2α − 1)+ < B ≤ α, given the signal design in Table III, (130)-(134)
and (163)-(164), the error probability of estimating {v1,c, v1,p, v2,c, v2,m} from y1 is
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c} ∪ {v2,m 6= vˆ2,m}]→ 0 as P →∞. (169)
Proof. See Appendix F.
By following the steps in (151)-(154), the term I(v1, v2; y2) can be bounded by
I(v1, v2; y2) ≤ o(logP ). (170)
The bounds in (168) and (170) then reveal that
I(v1, v2; y1)− I(v1, v2; y2) ≥ 1− 4
2
logP + o(logP ). (171)
By following the steps in (156)-(162), we also have
I(v1; y1|v2) ≥ 1−B − 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (172)
I(v2; y1|v1) ≥ B − 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (173)
Given the results of (140), (171), (172) and (173) it implies that the GDoF region {(d1, d2)|d1 + d2 ≤
1, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1−B, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ B} is achievable for this case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 23 and (2α− 1)+ < B ≤ α.
Finally, by combining the results of the above two cases and by moving B from 0 to α, it reveals that
for almost all the channel realizations the proposed scheme achieves D∗(α) in this case of 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
.
B. 2
3
≤ α < 1
When 2
3
≤ α < 1, we will also divide the analysis into two cases.
1) 0 ≤ B ≤ 2α− 1: In the case with 2
3
≤ α < 1 and B ≤ 2α− 1, the signals of the transmitters have
the same forms as in (141) and (142), and the signals of the receivers take the same forms as in (143)
and (144). In this case, we have
I(v1, v2; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]
) ·H(v1, v2)− 1 (174)
=
1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ) (175)
for almost all the channel coefficients, where (174) follows from the steps in (145)-(147); the last step
stems from Lemma 7 (see below) and the derivation that H(v1, v2) = H(v1,c) + H(v1,p) + H(v2,c) =
1−3
2
logP + o(logP ).
Lemma 7. When 2
3
≤ α < 1 and 0 ≤ B ≤ 2α− 1, given the signal design in Table III, (130)-(134) and
(141)-(142), for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the error probability of decoding
{v1,c, v1,p, v2,c} from y1 is vanishing when P is large, i.e.,
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]→ 0 as P →∞. (176)
Proof. See Appendix G.
From the steps in (151)-(154), one can easily show that
I(v1, v2; y2) ≤ o(logP ). (177)
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With (175) and (177) we have the following inequality
I(v1, v2; y1)− I(v1, v2; y2) ≥ 1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ) (178)
for almost all the channel coefficients. From the steps in (156)-(162), the following two inequalities can
be easily derived
I(v1; y1|v2) ≥ 1−B − 2
2
logP + o(logP ), (179)
I(v2; y1|v1) ≥ B − 
2
logP + o(logP ). (180)
From (140), (178), (179) and (180) we can conclude that the secure GDoF region {(d1, d2)|d1 + d2 ≤
1, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1 − B, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ B} is achievable for almost all the channel coefficients for this case with
0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and 0 ≤ B ≤ 2α− 1.
2) 2α− 1 < B ≤ α: In the case with 2
3
≤ α < 1 and 2α− 1 < B ≤ α, based on the parameter design
in (128)-(139) and Table III, the transmitted signals are expressed as
x1 =v1,c +
τ/2∑
`=1
δ1,`
√
P−β1,1,` · (u1 +√P 1+B−2α · u2) (181)
x2 =
√
Pα−1
h21
h22
v2,c +
√
PB−α
h21
h22
v2,m +
τ/2∑
`=1
δ2,`
√
P−β1,2,` · (u1 +√P 1+B−2α · u2) (182)
and the received signals have the following forms
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 2α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,c +
√
PB
h12h21
h22
v2,m + z1 (183)
y2 =
√
Pαh21(v1,c + v2,c + u1) +
√
PB+1−αh21(v2,m + u2)
+
√
Pα−β1,1,τ/2δ1,τ/2h21u1 +
√
PB+1−α−β1,1,τ/2δ1,τ/2h21u2 + z2. (184)
In this case, we have
I(v1, v2; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c} ∪ {v2,m 6= vˆ2,m}]
) ·H(v1, v2)− 1 (185)
=
1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ) (186)
where (185) stems from the steps in (145)-(147); (186) uses the facts that H(v1, v2) = H(v1,c)+H(v2,c)+
H(v2,m) = 1−32 logP + o(logP ) and that Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c} ∪ {v2,m 6= vˆ2,m}] → 0 as
P →∞ by following the proof steps of Lemma 6, using a successive decoding method. From the steps
in (151)-(154), we have
I(v1, v2; y2) ≤ o(logP ), (187)
which, together with the result of (186), reveals that
I(v1, v2; y1)− I(v1, v2; y2) ≥ 1− 3
2
logP + o(logP ). (188)
From the steps in (156)-(162), the following two inequalities can be easily derived
I(v1; y1|v2) ≥ 1−B − 
2
logP + o(logP ), (189)
I(v2; y1|v1) ≥ B − 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (190)
With the results in (140), (188), (189) and (190), we can conclude that the GDoF region {(d1, d2)|d1+d2 ≤
1, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1−B, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ B} is achievable for this case with 23 ≤ α < 1 and 2α− 1 < B ≤ α.
Finally, by combining the results of the above two cases and by moving B from 0 to α, it reveals that
for almost all the channel realizations the proposed scheme achieves D∗(α) in this case of 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
.
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C. α = 1
In the case with α = 1, for any GDoF pair (d′1, d
′
2) such that (d
′
1, d
′
2) ∈ D∗(1), we will provide the
following scheme and show that the GDoF pair (d′1, d
′
2) is achievable with d
′
c = max{d′1, d′2} GDoF
common randomness. Based on the parameter design in (128)-(139) and Table III, then the transmitted
signals are designed as
x1 =εv1,c − ε h12h21
h11h22 − h12h21 · u1 (191)
x2 =ε
h21
h22
· v2,c + ε h11h21
h11h22 − h12h21 · u1. (192)
The PAM constellation sets of the random variables {v1,c, v2,c, u1} are designed as
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η1,cγ
Q
, Q = P
d
′
1−
2 ) (193)
v2,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η2,cγ
Q
, Q = P
d
′
2−
2 ) (194)
u1 ∈ Ω(ξ = γ
Q
, Q = P
max{d′1−, d
′
2−}
2 ). (195)
In terms of the signals at the receivers, we have
y1 = ε
√
Ph11v1,c + ε
√
P
h12h21
h22
· v2,c + z1 (196)
y2 = ε
√
Ph21(v1,c + v2,c + u1) + z2. (197)
We first focus on the bound of I(v1, v2; y1) − I(v1, v2; y2) in (140). By following the derivations in
(145)-(147), the term I(v1, v2; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1, v2; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]
) ·H(v1, v2)− 1 (198)
where vk = vk,c for k ∈ {1, 2}, and the entropy H(v1, v2) in (198) is derived as
H(v1, v2) = H(v1,c) +H(v2,c) =
d
′
1 + d
′
2 − 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (199)
The lemma below states a result on the error probability appeared in (198).
Lemma 8. When α = 1, given the signal design in Table III and (191)-(195), for almost all the channel
realizations, the error probability of decoding {v1,c, v2,c} from y1 is vanishing, that is,
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]→ 0 as P →∞. (200)
Proof. See Appendix H.
By combining the results of (198), (199) and Lemma 8, I(v1, v2; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1, v2; y1) ≥ d
′
1 + d
′
2 − 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (201)
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2. For the term I(v1, v2; y2), it can be upper bounded
by
I(v1, v2; y2) ≤ I(v1, v2; y2, v1,c + v2,c + u1)
= I(v1, v2; v1,c + v2,c + u1) + I(v1, v2; y2|v1,c + v2,c + u1)
≤ H(v1,c + v2,c + u1)−H(u1) + h(y2|v1,c + v2,c + u1)− h(y2|v1,c + v2,c + u1, v1, v2) (202)
≤ log(6P max{d
′
1, d
′
2}−
2 + 1)− log(2P max{d
′
1, d
′
2}−
2 + 1) (203)
≤ log 3 (204)
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where (203) follows from (153). Due to our design in (135)-(136), there is an integer relationship between
the minimum distance of the constellation for v1,c and the minimum distance of the constellation for v2,c.
This integer relationship allows to minimize the value of H(v1,c+v2,c+u1) in (202), which can be treated
as a GDoF penalty. Then the results of (201) and (204) give
I(v1, v2; y1)− I(v1, v2; y2) ≥ d
′
1 + d
′
2 − 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (205)
for almost all the channel coefficients. Let us now consider the term I(v1; y1|v2) in (140) and find its
bound. By following the steps in (157)-(161), the term I(v1; y1|v2) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1|v2) ≥ d
′
1 − 
2
logP + o(logP ). (206)
Similarly, the term I(v2; y1|v1) in (140) can be bounded by
I(v2; y1|v1) ≥ d
′
2 − 
2
logP + o(logP ). (207)
Finally, by incorporating the results of (205)-(207) into (140), it suggests that the secure GDoF pair
(d
′
1, d
′
2) is achievable by using d
′
c = max{d′1, d′2} GDoF of common randomness (mainly due to u1), for
almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2. By moving d′1 from 0 to 1−d′2 and moving d′2 from 0
to 1, then we can conclude that any GDoF pair (d′1, d
′
2) ∈ D∗(1) is achievable by using d′c = max{d′1, d′2}
GDoF of common randomness, for almost all the channel coefficients, in this case with α = 1.
D. α > 1
We have proved in Sections VII-A-VII-C that the optimal secure GDoF regionD∗(α) is achievable by the
proposed scheme when α ≤ 1, where D∗(α) = {(d1, d2)|d1 + d2 ≤ max{1, α}, 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ α}.
Let us consider a secure GDoF pair (d′1, d
′
2) such that (d
′
1, d
′
2) ∈ D∗(α), with conditions 0 ≤ d′1 ≤ 1−d′2
and 0 ≤ d′2 ≤ α, for α ≤ 1. From Sections VII-A-VII-C, it reveals that the proposed scheme is able
to achieve this secure GDoF pair (d′1, d
′
2) with a certain amount of GDoF common randomness. For
notationally convenience let us use d′c to denote that amount of GDoF common randomness for achieving
the corresponding GDoF pair (d′1, d
′
2) in the proposed scheme. For this secure GDoF tuple (d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
c), it
holds true that
(d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
c) ∈ D¯(α) (208)
since it is achievable by the proposed scheme, for α ≤ 1. From the result of Lemma 4, it also holds true
that (
d
′
2/α, d
′
1/α, d
′
c/α
) ∈ D¯(1/α). (209)
In other words, the secure GDoF tuple (d′2/α, d
′
1/α, d
′
c/α) is included in the region D¯(1/α) and the
secure GDoF pair (d′2/α, d
′
1/α) is included in the region D∗( 1α), for α ≤ 1. Then, by moving d
′
2 from 0
to α and moving d′1 from 0 to 1 − d′2, it implies that any point in D∗( 1α) = {(d1, d2)|d1 + d2 ≤ 1α , 0 ≤
d1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ 1α} is achievable for α ≤ 1. Let α
′
= 1/α, we finally conclude that the optimal secure
GDoF region D∗(α′) = {(d1, d2)|d1 + d2 ≤ α′ , 0 ≤ d1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ d2 ≤ α′} is achievable for α′ > 1.
VIII. CONVERSE
In this section we provide the converse proofs for Theorems 4-6, regarding the minimal GDoF of the
common randomness to achieve the maximal secure sum GDoF, secure GDoF, and the maximal secure
GDoF region for interference channel, wiretap channel with a helper, and multiple access wiretap channel,
respectively. Let us define that
sk`(t),
√
Pαk`hk`x`(t) + zk(t)
for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= `. Let snk`,{sk`(t)}nt=1.
31
A. Converse for two-user interference channel
We begin with the converse proof of Theorem 4, for the two-user interference channel defined in
Section II-A. The following lemma reveals a bound on the minimal GDoF of common randomness d∗c(α),
for achieving the maximal secure sum GDoF d∗sum(α).
Lemma 9. Given the two-user symmetric Gaussian IC-SC channel (see Section II-A), the minimal GDoF
of the common randomness d∗c(α) for achieving the maximal secure sum GDoF d
∗
sum(α) satisfies the
following inequality
d∗c(α) ≥ d∗sum(α)/2− (1− α)+ α ∈ [0,∞). (210)
In what follows, we will prove Lemma 9. This proof will use the secrecy constraints and Fano’s
inequality. Starting with the secrecy constraint I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n, and with the identity of I(w1; yn2 ) =
I(w1;wc, w2, yn2 )− I(w1;wc, w2|yn2 ), we have
I(w1;wc, w2, yn2 ) ≤ I(w1;wc, w2|yn2 ) + n. (211)
The first term in the right-hand side of (211) is bounded as
I(w1;wc, w2|yn2 ) = H(wc, w2|yn2 )−H(wc, w2|yn2 , w1)
≤ H(wc) +H(w2|yn2 ) (212)
≤ H(wc) + nn (213)
where (212) uses the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; and (213) follows from Fano’s inequality.
On the other hand, the term in the left-hand side of (211) can be rewritten as
I(w1;wc, w2, yn2 ) = I(w1; yn2 |wc, w2)
= H(w1)−H(w1|wc, w2, yn2 ) (214)
using the independence between w1, wc and w2. By incorporating (213) and (214) into (211), it gives
H(w1) ≤ H(wc) +H(w1|wc, w2, yn2 ) + nn + n. (215)
For the second term in the right-hand side of (215), we have
H(w1|wc, w2, yn2 )
=H(w1|wc, w2, yn2 , sn21) (216)
≤H(w1|wc, w2, yn2 , sn21)−H(w1|yn1 ) + nn (217)
≤H(w1|wc, w2, sn21)−H(w1|yn1 , wc, w2, sn21) + nn
=I(w1; yn1 |wc, w2, sn21) + nn
=I(w1; {y1(t)−
√
P 1−α · h11
h21
s21(t)−
√
Pαh12x2(t)}nt=1|wc, w2, sn21) + nn (218)
=I(w1; {−
√
P 1−α · h11
h21
z2(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|wc, w2, sn21) + nn
=h({−
√
P 1−α · h11
h21
z2(t) + z1(t)}n|wc, w2, sn21)− h({−
√
P 1−α
h11
h21
z2(t) + z1(t)}n|w1, wc, w2, sn21) + nn
=h({−
√
P 1−α · h11
h21
z2(t) + z1(t)}n|wc, w2, sn21)− h(zn1 ) + nn (219)
≤n
2
log(1 + P 1−α · |h11|
2
|h21|2 ) + nn (220)
where (216) follows from the fact that sn21 can be reconstructed by {wc, w2, yn2 }; (217) is from Fano’s
inequality; (218) uses the fact that xn2 is a function of (wc, w2); (219) results from the fact that z
n
2 can be
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reconstructed from {w1, wc, w2, sn21}; (220) follows from the identity that conditioning reduces differential
entropy and the identity that h(zn1 ) =
n
2
log(2pie). Finally, given that H(w1) = nR1 and H(wc) = nRc,
combining the results of (215) and (220) gives the following inequality
nR1 − n
2
log(1 + P 1−α · |h11|
2
|h21|2 )− n
′
n ≤ nRc (221)
for ′n = 2n + . Due to the symmetry, by exchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, we also have
nR2 − n
2
log(1 + P 1−α · |h22|
2
|h12|2 )− n
′
n ≤ nRc. (222)
Based on the definitions of d∗c(α) and d
∗
sum(α) in Section II-A, combining the results of (221) and (222)
produces the following bound
d∗sum(α)/2− (1− α)+ ≤ d∗c(α), ∀α ∈ [0,∞) (223)
which completes the proof of Lemma 9.
B. Converse for the wiretap channel with a helper
Let us now focus on the converse proof of Theorem 5 for the wiretap channel with a helper. The
following lemma reveals a bound on the minimal GDoF of common randomness d∗c(α), for achieving the
maximal secure GDoF, i.e., d∗(α) = 1 for any α ∈ [0,∞) (see Theorem 2).
Lemma 10. Given the symmetric Gaussian WTH channel (see Section II-B), the minimal GDoF of the
common randomness d∗c(α) for achieving the maximal secure GDoF satisfies the following inequality
d∗c(α) ≥ 1− (1− α)+ α ∈ [0,∞). (224)
The proof of Lemma 10 follows closely from that of Lemma 9. From the secrecy constraint I(w1; yn2 ) ≤
n, and the identity of I(w1; yn2 ) = I(w1;wc, yn2 )− I(w1;wc|yn2 ), we have
I(w1;wc, yn2 ) ≤ I(w1;wc|yn2 ) + n. (225)
The first term in the right-hand side of (225) is bounded as
I(w1;wc|yn2 ) = H(wc|yn2 )−H(wc|yn2 , w1) ≤ H(wc) (226)
On the other hand, the term in the left-hand side of (225) can be rewritten as
I(w1;wc, yn2 ) = I(w1; yn2 |wc)
= H(w1|wc)−H(w1|wc, yn2 )
= H(w1)−H(w1|wc, yn2 ) (227)
using the independence between w1 and wc. By incorporating (226) and (227) into (225), it gives
H(w1) ≤ H(wc) +H(w1|wc, yn2 ) + n. (228)
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For the second term in the right-hand side of (228), by following the steps in (216)-(220) we have
H(w1|wc, yn2 )
=H(w1|wc, yn2 , sn21) (229)
≤H(w1|wc, yn2 , sn21)−H(w1|yn1 ) + nn (230)
≤H(w1|wc, sn21)−H(w1|yn1 , wc, sn21) + nn
=I(w1; yn1 |wc, sn21) + nn
=I(w1; {y1(t)−
√
P 1−α · h11
h21
s21(t)−
√
Pαh12x2(t)}nt=1|wc, sn21) + nn (231)
=I(w1; {−
√
P 1−α · h11
h21
z2(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|wc, sn21) + nn
≤n
2
log(1 + P 1−α · |h11|
2
|h21|2 ) + nn (232)
where (229) follows from the fact that sn21 can be reconstructed by {wc, yn2 }; (230) is from Fano’s
inequality; (231) uses the fact that xn2 is a function of wc; (232) follows from the identity that conditioning
reduces differential entropy. Finally, given that H(w1) = nR1 and H(wc) = nRc, combining the results
of (228) and (232) gives the following inequality
nR1 − n
2
log(1 + P 1−α · |h11|
2
|h21|2 )− n
′
n ≤ nRc (233)
for ′n = n + . Based on the definitions of d
∗
c(α) and d
∗(α) in Section II-B, and given the result of
Theorem 2, i.e., d∗(α) = 1,∀α ∈ [0,∞), the result of (233) gives the following bound
1− (1− α)+ ≤ d∗c(α), ∀α ∈ [0,∞) (234)
which completes the proof of Lemma 10.
C. Converse for two-user multiple access wiretap channel
Let us consider the converse proof of Theorem 6 for the two-user multiple access wiretap channel. The
following lemma gives a bound on the minimal GDoF of common randomness d∗c(α, d1, d2), for achieving
any given GDoF pair (d1, d2) in the maximal secure GDoF region D∗(α).
Lemma 11. For the symmetric Gaussian MAC-WT channel with common randomness (see Section II-C),
the minimal GDoF of the common randomness d∗c(α, d1, d2), for achieving any given GDoF pair (d1, d2)
in the maximal secure GDoF region D∗(α), satisfies the following inequality
d∗c(α, d1, d2) ≥ max{d1 − (1− α)+, d2 − (α− 1)+} for (d1, d2) ∈ D∗(α).
The following corollary is directly from Lemma 11 by considering the specific case with α = 1.
Corollary 1. For the symmetric Gaussian MAC-WT channel with common randomness defined in
Section II-C, and for α = 1, the minimal GDoF of the common randomness d∗c(1, d1, d2), for achieving
any given GDoF pair (d1, d2) in the maximal secure GDoF region D∗(1), satisfies the following inequality
d∗c(1, d1, d2) ≥ max{d1, d2} for (d1, d2) ∈ D∗(1), α = 1.
Let us now prove Lemma 11. This proof will also use the secrecy constraints and Fano’s inequality.
Starting with the secrecy constraint I(w1, w2; yn2 ) ≤ n, and with the identity of I(w1, w2; yn2 ) =
I(w1, w2;wc, yn2 )− I(w1, w2;wc|yn2 ), we have
I(w1, w2;wc, yn2 ) ≤ I(w1, w2;wc|yn2 ) + n. (235)
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The first term in the right-hand side of (235) is bounded as
I(w1, w2;wc|yn2 ) = H(wc|yn2 )−H(wc|yn2 , w1, w2)
≤ H(wc). (236)
On the other hand, the term in the left-hand side of (235) can be rewritten as
I(w1, w2;wc, yn2 ) = I(w1, w2; yn2 |wc)
= H(w1, w2)−H(w1, w2|wc, yn2 )
= H(w1) +H(w2)−H(w1, w2|wc, yn2 ) (237)
using the independence between w1, wc and w2. By incorporating (236) and (237) into (235), it gives
H(w2) ≤H(wc)−H(w1) +H(w1, w2|wc, yn2 ) + n
≤H(wc)−H(w1) +H(w1, w2|wc, yn2 )−H(w1, w2|yn1 ) + nn + n (238)
=H(wc)−H(w1) +H(w1|wc, yn2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+H(w2|w1, wc, yn2 )−H(w1|yn1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−H(w2|w1, yn1 ) + n′n
≤H(wc) +H(w2|w1, wc, yn2 )−H(w2|w1, yn1 ) + n′n (239)
for ′n, n + , where (238) stems from Fano’s equality. For the second and third terms in the right-hand
side of (239), we have
H(w2|w1, wc, yn2 )−H(w2|w1, yn1 )
≤H(w2|{
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t)}nt=1, w1, wc, yn2 )−H(w2|{
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t)}nt=1, w1, wc, yn1 ) (240)
≤H(w2|{
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t)}nt=1, w1, wc)−H(w2|{
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t)}nt=1, w1, wc, yn1 ) (241)
=I(w2; yn1 |{
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t)}nt=1, w1, wc)
=I(w2; {y1(t)−
√
Pα−1 · h12
h22
(
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t))−
√
Ph11x1(t)}nt=1|wc, w1, {
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t)}nt=1)
(242)
=I(w2; {−
√
Pα−1 · h12
h22
z2(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|wc, w1, {
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t)}nt=1)
≤n
2
log(1 + Pα−1 · |h12|
2
|h22|2 ) (243)
where (240) follows from the fact that {√Ph22x2(t)+z2(t)}nt=1 can be reconstructed by {w1, wc, yn2 } and
the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; (241) results from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy;
(242) uses the fact that xn1 is a function of (wc, w1); (243) follows from the identity that conditioning
reduces differential entropy. Combining the results of (239) and (243), it gives the following inequality
H(w2)− n
2
log(1 + Pα−1 · |h12|
2
|h22|2 )− n
′
n ≤ H(wc). (244)
Finally, given that H(w2) = nR2 and H(wc) = nRc, (244) implies the following inequality
nR2 − n
2
log(1 + Pα−1 · |h12|
2
|h22|2 )− n
′
n ≤ nRc. (245)
On the other hand, by interchanging the roles of transmitter 1 and transmitter 2, we also have
nR1 − n
2
log(1 + P 1−α · |h11|
2
|h21|2 )− n
′
n ≤ nRc. (246)
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Based on the definition of d∗c(α, d1, d2) in Section II-C, the results of (245) and (246) give the following
bound
max{d1 − (1− α)+, d2 − (α− 1)+} ≤ d∗c(α, d1, d2), for (d1, d2) ∈ D∗(α) (247)
which completes the proof of Lemma 11.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work we showed that adding common randomness at the transmitters totally removes the penalty
in sum GDoF or GDoF region of three basic channels. The results reveal that adding common randomness
at the transmitters is a constructive way to remove the secrecy constraints in communication networks
in terms of GDoF performance. Another contribution of this work is the characterization on the minimal
GDoF of the common randomness to remove the secrecy constraints. In the future work, we will focus
on how to remove the secrecy constraints in the other communication networks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We now prove Lemma 1. Let us first provide [12, Lemma 1] that will be used in the proof.
Lemma 12. [12, Lemma 1] Consider a specific channel model y′ =
√
Pα1h′x′ +
√
Pα2g′ + z′, where
x′ ∈ Ω(ξ,Q), and z′ ∼ N (0, σ2). g′ ∈ Sg′ is a discrete random variable with a condition
|g′| ≤ gmax, ∀g′ ∈ Sg′
for Sg′ ⊂ R. h′, gmax, σ, α2 and α1 are finite and positive constants that are independent of P . Also
consider the condition α1 − α2 > 0. Let γ′ > 0 be a finite parameter. If we set Q and ξ by
Q =
P
α′
2 h′γ′
2gmax
, ξ =
γ′
Q
, ∀α′ ∈ (0, α1 − α2) (248)
then the probability of error for decoding x′ from y′ satisfies
Pr(e)→ 0 as P →∞.
In this proof we will first estimate v1,c and v2,c+u from the observation y1 expressed in (27) with noise
removal and signal separation methods, and then estimate v1,p. Note that v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
α/2−
2 ),
v2,c + u ∈ 2Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
α/2−
2 ), and v1,p, v2,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ2Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ), where 2 · Ω(ξ,Q),{ξ · a :
a ∈ Z ∩ [−2Q, 2Q]}. For the observation y1 in (27), it can be expressed as
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
Pαh12(v2,c + u) + z˜1
= P
α/2+
2 · γ · (
√
P 1−αg0q0 + g1q1) + z˜1 (249)
where z˜1,
√
P 1−αh11v1,p +
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ2,τh12u+ h12v2,p + z1 and
g0,h11, g1,h12, q0,
Qmax
γ
· v1,c, q1, Qmax
γ
· (v2,c + u), Qmax,P
α/2−
2
for γ ∈ (0, 1
τ ·2τ
]
. It is true that q0, q1 ∈ Z , |q1| ≤ 2Qmax and |q0| ≤ Qmax.
Let us consider qˆ1 and qˆ0 as the corresponding estimates of q1 and q0 from y1 (see (249)). For this
estimation we specifically consider an estimator that seeks to minimize
|y1 − P
α/2+
2 · γ · (
√
P 1−αg0qˆ0 + g1qˆ1)|.
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The minimum distance defined below will be used in the error probability analysis for this estimation
dmin(g0, g1), min
q0,q′0∈Z∩[−Qmax,Qmax]
q1,q′1∈Z∩[−2Qmax,2Qmax]
(q0,q1)6=(q′0,q′1)
|
√
P 1−αg0(q0 − q′0) + g1(q1 − q′1)|. (250)
Lemma 14 (see below) will reveal that, for almost all channel realizations, this minimum distance is
sufficiently large when P is large. The result of [28, Lemma 1] shown below will be used in the proof.
Lemma 13. [28, Lemma 1] Let us consider a parameter η such that η > 1 and η ∈ Z+, and consider
β ∈ (0, 1] and Q0, A0, Q1, A1 ∈ Z+. Also define two events as
B˜(q0, q1),{(g0, g1) ∈ (1, η]2 : |A1g1q1 + A0g0q0| < β} (251)
and
B˜,
⋃
q0,q1∈Z:
(q0,q1)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B˜(q0, q1). (252)
For L(B˜) denoting the Lebesgue measure of B˜, then this measure is bounded as
L(B˜) ≤ 8β(η − 1) min
{Q0Q1
A1
,
Q1Q0
A0
,
Q0η
A1
,
Q1η
A0
}
.
Lemma 14. For  > 0 and κ ∈ (0, 1] and consider the design in (16)-(18) and (24)-(25) when α ∈ [2/3, 1).
Then the following inequality holds true for the minimum distance dmin defined in (250)
dmin ≥ κP−
3α/2−1
2 (253)
for all channel realizations {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ Hout, where the Lebesgue measure of Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×2
satisfies
L(Hout) ≤ 64κ · P− 2 . (254)
Proof. For this case we set η, 2 and define
β,κP−
3α/2−1
2 , A0,
√
P 1−α, A1, 1, Q0, 2Qmax, Q1, 4Qmax, Qmax,P
α/2−
2 .
From the previous definitions, g0 = h11 and g1 = h12. Without loss of generality (WLOG) we will consider
the case that4 A0, Q0, A1, Q1 ∈ Z+. Let us define
B˜(q0, q1),{(g0, g1) ∈ (1, η]2 : |A1g1q1 + A0g0q0| < β} (255)
and
B˜,
⋃
q0,q1∈Z:
(q0,q1)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B˜(q0, q1). (256)
4Our result also holds true for the scenario when any of the four parameters {A0, Q0, A1, Q1} isn’t an integer. It just requires some
minor modifications in the proof. Let us consider one example when A0 isn’t an integer. For this example, the parameters A0 and g0 can
be replaced with A′0,ω0A0 and g′0, 1ω0 g0, respectively, where ω0, dA0e/A0. From the definition, ω0 is bounded, i.e., 1/2 < 1/ω0 < 1,
and A′0 = ω0A0 is an integer. Let us consider another example when Q0 = 2
√
Pα/2− isn’t an integer. For this example, the parameter 
can be slightly modified such that Q0 = 2
√
Pα/2− is an integer and  can still be very small when P is large. Therefore, throughout this
work, WLOG we will consider those parameters to be integers, i.e., A0, Q0, A1, Q1 ∈ Z+.
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From Lemma 13, the Lebesgue measure of B˜ can be bounded by
L(B˜) ≤ 8β(η − 1) min{8Q
2
max
1
,
8Q2max√
P 1−α
,
2Qmaxη
1
,
4Qmaxη√
P 1−α
} (257)
= 8β(η − 1) ·Qmax ·min{8Qmax, 8Qmax√
P 1−α
, 2η,
4η√
P 1−α
}
≤ 8β(η − 1) ·Qmax · P α−12 ·min{8Qmax, 4η}
≤ 8β(η − 1) ·Qmax · P α−12 · 4η
= 32βη(η − 1) · P 3α/2−1−2
= 32η(η − 1)κP− 2
= 64κP−

2 . (258)
Based on the definition in (256), B˜ is a set of (g0, g1), where (g0, g1) ∈ (1, η]2. For any (g0, g1) ∈ B˜,
there exists at least one pair (q0, q1) such that |A1g1q1 +A0g0q0| < κP− 3α/2−12 . Thus, B˜ can be treated as
the outage set and we have the following conclusion:
dmin(g0, g1) ≥ κP−
3α/2−1
2 , for (g0, g1) /∈ B˜.
Let us now define Hout as a set of (h22, h21, h12, h11) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 such that the corresponding pairs
(g0, g1) appear in B˜ (outage set), that is,
Hout,{(h22, h21, h12, h11) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 : (g0, g1) ∈ B˜}. (259)
From the relationship between B˜ and Hout, the Lebesgue measure of Hout can be bounded by
L(Hout) =
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h11=1
1Hout(h22, h21, h12, h11)dh11dh12dh21dh22 (260)
=
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h11=1
1B˜(h11, h12)dh11dh12dh21dh22
≤
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ η
g1=1
∫ η
g0=1
1B˜(g0, g1)dg0dg1dh21dh22
=
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ 2
h21=1
L(B˜)dh21dh22
≤
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ 2
h21=1
64κ · P− 2dh21dh22 (261)
= 64κ · P− 2 (262)
where
1Hout(h22, h21, h12, h11) =
{
1 if (h22, h21, h12, h11) ∈ Hout
0 if (h22, h21, h12, h11) /∈ Hout
and
1B˜(g0, g1) =
{
1 if (g0, g1) ∈ B˜
0 if (g0, g1) /∈ B˜
and (261) is from (258).
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Lemma 14 suggests that, the minimum distance dmin defined in (250) is sufficiently large for almost
all the channel coefficients when P is large. Let us focus on the channel coefficients not in the outage
set Hout and rewrite the observation y1 in (249) as
y1 =P
α/2+
2 · γ · xs +
√
P 1−αg˜ + z1 (265)
where xs,
√
P 1−αg0q0 + g1q1 and g˜,h11v1,p +
√
P (τ+2)α−τ−1δ2,τh12u+
√
Pα−1h12v2,p. It is true that
|g˜| ≤ g˜max, 1
τ · 2τ−1 +
2
τ
, ∀g˜.
For the observation in (265), we will decode xs by considering other signals as noise (called as noise
removal) and then recover q0 and q1 from xs by using the rational independence between g0 and g1 (called
as signal separation, see [29]). Given the channel coefficients outside the outage set Hout, Lemma 14
suggests that, the minimum distance for xs satisfies dmin ≥ κP− 3α/2−12 . With this result, the probability
of error for the estimation of xs from y1 is bounded by
Pr[xs 6= xˆs] ≤Pr
[
|z1 + P 1−α2 g˜| > P
α/2+
2 · γ · dmin
2
]
≤2 ·Q(P α/2+2 · γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜max
)
(266)
≤2 ·Q(P 1−α2 (γκP 2
2
− 1
τ · 2τ−1 −
2
τ
)
)
(267)
where Q(c), 1√
2pi
∫∞
c
exp(−u2
2
)du and (266) use the fact that |g˜| ≤ g˜max, 1τ ·2τ−1 + 2τ ,∀g˜; and the last
step uses the result of dmin ≥ κP− 3α/2−12 . From the step in (267), it implies that
Pr[xs 6= xˆs]→ 0 as P →∞. (268)
Note that q0 and q1 (and consequently v1,c and v2,c + u) can be recovered from xs due to rational
independence.
After decoding xs we can estimate v1,p from the following observation
y1 − P
α/2+
2 · γ · xs =
√
P 1−αh11v1,p +
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ2,τh12u+ h12v2,p + z1.
Given that v1,p, v2,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ2Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) and
√
P (τ+1)α−τδ2,τh12u + h12v2,p ≤ 2τ + 1τ ·2τ , from
Lemma 12 we can conclude that the probability of error for the estimation of v1,p satisfies
Pr[vˆ1,p 6= v1,p]→ 0 as P →∞. (269)
With (268) and (269) we can conclude that
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]→ 0 as P →∞ (270)
for almost all the channel realizations. For the case with k = 2, it is proved with the same way using the
symmetry property.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We here prove Lemma 2. Due to the symmetry, we only focus on the case of k = 1. In this setting
with 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, successive decoding method will be used. For the observation y1 described in (65),
it can be expressed in the following form
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
Pαg + z1 (271)
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where
g,h12(v2,c + u) +
√
P 1−2αh11v1,p +
√
P−αh12v2,p −
√
P 2α−2 · h
2
12h21
h11h22
u.
One can check that |g| ≤ 14
τ ·2τ holds true for any realization of g. Then, Lemma 12 reveals that the error
probability of the estimation of v1,c is
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0, as P →∞. (272)
After that, v2,c + u can be estimated from the observation below
y1 −
√
Ph11v1,c =
√
Pαh12(v2,c + u) +
√
P 1−αg′ + z1 (273)
where g′,h11v1,p +
√
Pα−1h12v2,p −
√
P 4α−3 · h212h21
h11h22
u. Note that v2,c + u ∈ 2Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
2α−1−
2 ).
One can also check that |g′| ≤ 10
τ ·2τ . Let sˆvu be an estimate of svu, v2,c + u. Then, Lemma 12 suggests
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu]→ 0, as P →∞. (274)
Similarly, after decoding v2,c + u we can decode v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) with
Pr[v1,p 6= vˆ1,p]→ 0 as P →∞. (275)
With results (272) and (275), then we have
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]→ 0 as P →∞.
The case with k = 2 is also proved using the same way due the symmetry.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Here we prove Lemma 3, considering the case of 1/2 < α < 1. We will show that, given y1 expressed
in (94), we can estimate vc and vp with vanishing error probability. For the expression of y1, it can be
written in the following form
y1 =
√
Ph11vc +
√
P 1−αg′ + z1
where g′,h11vp +
√
P−(2τ−2τα−α)δ2,τh12u. It is true that
|g′| ≤ 1 + 4
τ
(τ + 2)4τ
for any realizations of g′. Recall that vp ∈ Ω(ξ = γ2Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ), vc, u ∈ Ω(ξ = γQ , Q = P
α−
2 ), and
γ ∈ (0, 1
(τ+2)4τ
]. With the result of Lemma 12, the error probability of estimating vc from y1 is
Pr[vc 6= vˆc]→ 0, as P →∞. (276)
Then, we remove vc from y1 and estimate vp from the following observation
y1 −
√
Ph11vc =
√
P 1−αh11vp +
√
P 2τα+1−2τδ2,τh12u+ z1. (277)
Since
|δ2,τh12u| ≤ 1
τ + 2
,
then by Lemma 12 the error probability of estimating vp from the observation in (277) is
Pr[vp 6= vˆp|vc = vˆc]→ 0, as P →∞. (278)
With (276) and (278), it gives
Pr[{vc 6= vˆc} ∪ {vp 6= vˆp}]→ 0 as P →∞.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Lemma 4 is proved here. For a MAC-WT channel, the channel input-output relationship can be described
as (see (1) and (2))
y1(t) =
√
Ph11x1(t) +
√
Pαh12x2(t) + z1(t)
y2(t) =
√
Pαh21x1(t) +
√
Ph22x2(t) + z2(t).
(279)
By interchanging the role of transmitter 1 and transmitter 2 in the MAC-WT channel, the channel input-
output relationship can be alternately represented as
y1(t) =
√
P ′α
′
h
′
12x
′
2(t) +
√
P ′h
′
11x
′
1(t) + z1(t)
y2(t) =
√
P ′h
′
22x
′
2(t) +
√
P ′α
′
h
′
21x
′
1(t) + z2(t)
(280)
where
h
′
11 = h12, h
′
12 = h11, h
′
21 = h22, h
′
22 = h21
x
′
1(t) = x2(t), x
′
2(t) = x1(t), P
′
= Pα, α
′
=
1
α
.
(281)
Note that the secure capacity region and the secure GDoF region of the MAC-WT channel expressed in
(280) are C¯(P ′ , α′) and D¯(α′), respectively. Assume a scheme Γ achieves a rate tuple (R′1, R′2, R′c) in
the channel expressed in (279), i.e., transmitter 1 achieves a rate R1 = R
′
1 and transmitter 2 achieves
a rate R2 = R
′
2 by using common randomness rate Rc = R
′
c. Then the same scheme Γ achieves rates
R1 = R
′
2, R2 = R
′
1, by using common randomness rate Rc = R
′
c in the channel expressed in (280), because
the channel expressed in (280) can be reverted back to the channel expressed in (279) by interchanging
the role of transmitters.
For any tuple (d′1, d
′
2, d
′
c) such that (d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
c) ∈ D¯(α) in the channel expressed in (279), there exists
a scheme Γ that achieves a rate tuple in the form of(
R1 =
d
′
1
2
logP + o(logP ), R2 =
d
′
2
2
logP + o(logP ), Rc =
d
′
c
2
logP + o(logP )
)
. (282)
Based on the above argument, by interchanging the role of transmitter 1 and transmitter 2 in the channel
expressed in (279), the same scheme Γ achieves a rate tuple in the form of(
R1 =
d
′
2
2
logP + o(logP ), R2 =
d
′
1
2
logP + o(logP ), Rc =
d
′
c
2
logP + o(logP )
)
(283)
in the channel expressed in (280). Then the following GDoF tuple

d1
d2
dc
 =

lim
P ′→∞
d
′
2
2
logP+o(logP )
1
2
logP ′
lim
P ′→∞
d
′
1
2
logP+o(logP )
1
2
logP ′
lim
P ′→∞
d
′
c
2
logP+o(logP )
1
2
logP ′

=

lim
P ′→∞
1
α
(
d
′
2
2
logP
′
+αo( logP
′
α
)
)
1
2
logP ′
lim
P ′→∞
1
α
(
d
′
1
2
logP
′
+αo( logP
′
α
)
)
1
2
logP ′
lim
P ′→∞
1
α
(
d
′
c
2
logP
′
+αo( logP
′
α
)
)
1
2
logP ′

=

1
α
d
′
2
1
α
d
′
1
1
α
d
′
c

is achievable in the channel expressed in (280), which implies
(
1
α
d
′
2,
1
α
d
′
1,
1
α
d
′
c
) ∈ D¯(α′). Since α′ = 1
α
,
then we get ( 1
α
d
′
2,
1
α
d
′
1,
1
α
d
′
c
) ∈ D¯( 1
α
)
which completes the proof.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Lemma 5 is proved in this section, for the case with 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and 0 ≤ B ≤ (2α− 1)+. In this case,
we will first estimate v1,c from y1 expressed in (143) based on successive decoding method, and we will
then estimate v2,c and v1,p simultaneously based on noise removal and signal separation methods.
In the first step, we rewrite y1 from (143) to the following form
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 1−αg + z1 (284)
where g,h11v1,p +
√
P 3α−2 h12h21
h22
v2,c. Since g is bounded, i.e., |g| ≤ 9τ ·2τ , from Lemma 12 we can
conclude that v1,c can be estimated from y1 with vanishing error probability:
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0 as P →∞. (285)
In the second step v2,c and v1,p will be estimated simultaneously from the following observation
y1 −
√
Ph11v1,c =
√
P 2α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,c +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p + z1
= γ(A0g0q0 + A1g1q1) + z1 (286)
where
g0,
η2,ch12h21
h22
, g1,
1
2
h11, A0,
√
P 2α−1−B+, A1,
√
PB+, q0,
√
PB−
η2,cγ
·v2,c, q1, 2
√
P 1−α−B−
γ
·v1,p
for γ ∈ (0, 1
τ ·2τ
]
. In this setting, q0, q1 ∈ Z , |q0| ≤
√
PB−, and |q1| ≤
√
P 1−α−B−. Let us define the
following minimum distance
dmin(g0, g1), min
q0,q′0∈Z∩
[
−
√
PB−,
√
PB−
]
q1,q′1∈Z∩
[
−
√
P 1−α−B−,
√
P 1−α−B−
]
(q0,q1)6=(q′0,q′1)
|A0g0(q0 − q′0) + A1g1(q1 − q′1)| (287)
which will be used for the analysis of the estimation of q0 and q1 from the observation in (286). The
following lemma provides a result on bounding this minimum distance.
Lemma 15. For the case of 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and 0 ≤ B ≤ (2α− 1)+, consider the signal design in Table III,
(130)-(134) and (141)-(142). Let  > 0 and κ ∈ (0, 1]. Then the minimum distance dmin defined in (287)
satisfies the following inequality
dmin ≥ κP 2 (288)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ Hout, where the Lebesgue measure of the set Hout ⊆
(1, 2]2×2 satisfies
L(Hout) ≤ 3584κ · P− 2 . (289)
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Lemma 14. In this case we set η, 8 and
β,κP 2 , Q0, 2
√
PB−, Q1, 2
√
P 1−α−B−.
Recall that g0 =
η2,ch12h21
h22
, g1 = 12h11, A0 =
√
P 2α−1−B+, and A1 =
√
PB+. We also define two events
B˜(q0, q1) and B˜ as in (255) and (256), respectively. By following the steps in (257)-(258), with Lemma 13
involved, then the Lebesgue measure of B˜ satisfies the following inequality
L(B˜) ≤ 896κ · P− 2 . (290)
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With our definition, B˜ is a collection of (g0, g1) and can be treated as an outage set. Let us define Hout as
a set of (h11, h21, h12, h22) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 such that the corresponding pairs (g0, g1) are in the outage set B˜,
using the same definition as in (259). Then by following the steps in (260)-(262), the Lebesgue measure
of Hout can be bounded as
L(Hout) ≤ 3584κ · P− 2 . (291)
Lemma 15 suggests that, the minimum distance dmin defined in (287) is sufficiently large, i.e., dmin ≥
κP

2 , for almost all the channel coefficients when P is large. Let us focus on the channel coefficients not
in the outage set Hout. Let xs,A0g0q0 + A1g1q1. Then it is easy to show that the error probability for
the estimation of xs from the observation in (286) is
Pr[xs 6= xˆs]→ 0 as P →∞. (292)
Note that v2,c and v1,p can be recovered from xs due to rational independence. At this point, with (285)
and (292), we finally conclude that
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]→ 0 as P →∞
for almost all the channel coefficients.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Lemma 6 is proved in this section, for the case of 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
and (2α − 1)+ < B ≤ α. In this case,
v1,c, v1,p, v2,m, and v2,c will be estimated from y1 expressed in (165) based on successive decoding. From
the expression in (165), y1 can be rewritten as
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 1−αg + z1 (293)
where g is defined as
g,h11v1,p +
√
P 3α−2
h12h21
h22
v2,c +
√
PB+α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,m.
In this setting g is bounded, i.e., |g| ≤ 11
τ ·2τ for any realizations of g. From Lemma 12, it then reveals that
the error probability of decoding v1,c based on y1 is vanishing, i.e.,
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0, as P →∞. (294)
After decoding v1,c, we can estimate v1,p from the following observation
y1 −
√
Ph11v1,c =
√
P 1−αh11v1,p +
√
PBg′ + z1 (295)
where g′, h12h21
h22
v2,m +
√
P 2α−B−1 h12h21
h22
v2,c. It is easy to show that g′ is bounded, i.e., |g′| ≤ 5τ ·2τ−1 .
Again, Lemma 12 suggests that the error probability of decoding v1,p based on the observation in (295)
is
Pr[v1,p 6= vˆ1,p]→ 0, as P →∞. (296)
With the similar method as above (successive decoding), one can also easily show that v2,m can be decoded
with vanishing error probability and then v2,c can be decoded with vanishing error probability as well,
i.e.,
Pr[v2,m 6= vˆ2,m]→ 0, as P →∞ (297)
and
Pr[v2,c 6= vˆ2,c]→ 0, as P →∞. (298)
Finally we can conclude from (294), (296), (297) and (298) that
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c} ∪ {v2,m 6= vˆ2,m}]→ 0 as P →∞. (299)
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
We provide the proof of Lemma 7 in this section for the case of 2
3
≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ B ≤ 2α− 1. The
proof is divided into two sub-cases, i.e., 0 ≤ B ≤ 3α− 2 and 3α− 2 ≤ B ≤ 2α− 1.
A. 0 ≤ B ≤ 3α− 2
For the case of 2
3
≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ B ≤ 3α− 2, the observation y1 expressed in (143) can be rewritten
in the following form
y1 =
√
P 1−αh11v1,p +
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 2α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,c + z1
= 2γ
√
P (g0q0 +
√
P 1−α+Bg1q1 +
√
P 2α−1−Bg2q2) + z1 (300)
where
g0,
h11
4
, g1,
η1,ch11
2
, g2,
η2,ch12h21
2h22
, q0,
2
√
P 1−α−
γ
· v1,p, q1,
√
Pα−B−
η1,cγ
· v1,c, q2,
√
PB−
η2,cγ
· v2,c
for γ ∈ (0, 1
τ ·2τ ], 1 ≤ η1,c < 2, 1 ≤ η2,c < 2, v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ2Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ), v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η1,cγQ , Q =
P
α−B−
2 ) and v2,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η2,cγQ , Q = P
B−
2 ). Based on our definition, it implies that q0, q1, q2 ∈ Z ,
|q0| ≤
√
P 1−α−, |q1| ≤
√
Pα−B−, and |q2| ≤
√
PB−. Let us define the following minimum distance
dmin(g0, g1, g2), min
q0,q′0,∈Z∩[−
√
P 1−α−,
√
P 1−α−]
q1,q′1,∈Z∩[−
√
Pα−B−,
√
Pα−B−]
q2,q′2∈Z∩[−
√
PB−,
√
PB−]
(q0,q1,q2) 6=(q′0,q′1,q′2)
|g0(q0−q′0) +
√
P 1−α+Bg1(q1−q′1) +
√
P 2α−1−Bg2(q2−q′2)|
(301)
which will be used for the analysis of the estimation of q0, q1 and q2 from the observation in (300). The
lemma below states a result on bounding this minimum distance.
Lemma 16. Consider the parameters κ ∈ (0, 1] and  > 0, and consider the signal design in Table III,
(130)-(134) and (141)-(142) for the case of 2
3
≤ α < 1 and 0 ≤ B ≤ 3α− 2. Then the minimum distance
dmin defined in (301) satisfies the following inequality
dmin ≥ κP 2 (302)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ Hout, where the Lebesgue measure of the outage set
Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 satisfies the following inequality
L(Hout) ≤ 193536κP− 2 . (303)
Proof. In this case we let
β,κP 2 , A1,
√
P 1−α+B, A2,
√
P 2α−1−B, Q0, 2
√
P 1−α−, Q1, 2
√
Pα−B−, Q2, 2
√
PB−,
for some  > 0, κ ∈ (0, 1], 1 ≤ η1,c < 2 and 1 ≤ η2,c < 2. Recall that g0 = h114 , g1 = η1,ch112 , and
g2 =
η2,ch12h21
2h22
. We also define the following two sets
B′(q0, q1, q2),{(g0, g1, g2) ∈ (1, 4]3 : |g0q0 + A1g1q1 + A2g2q2| < β}
and
B′,
⋃
q0,q1,q2∈Z:
(q0,q1,q2)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B′(q0, q1, q2). (304)
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With the result of [30, Lemma 14] we can bound the Lebesgue measure of B′ as
L(B′) ≤ 504β
(2Q0
A2
+
Q0Q˜2
A1
+
2Q0
A1
+
Q0Q˜1
A2
)
(305)
where Q˜1 = min
{
Q1, 8 · max{Q0,A2Q2}A1
}
= 16
√
P 3α−2−B− and Q˜2 = min
{
Q2, 8 · max{Q0,A1Q1}A2
}
=
2
√
PB−. By plugging the values of the parameters into (305), we can easily bound L(B′) as
L(B′) ≤ 24192κP− 2 . (306)
With our definition, B′ is a collection of (g0, g1, g2) and can be treated as an outage set. Let us define
Hout,{(h22, h21, h12, h11) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 : (g0, g1, g2) ∈ B′} as a set of (h22, h21, h12, h11) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 such
that the corresponding pairs (g0, g1) are in the outage set B′. Let us also define the indicator function
1Hout(h22, h21, h12, h11) = 1 if (h22, h21, h12, h11) ∈ Hout, else 1Hout(h22, h21, h12, h11) = 0; and define
another indicator function 1B′(g1, g2) = 1 if (g0 = g12η1,c , g1, g2) ∈ B′, else 1B′(g1, g2) = 0. Then by
following the steps in (260)-(262), the Lebesgue measure of Hout can be bounded as
L(Hout) ≤ 193536κP− 2 . (307)
Lemma 16 suggests that, the minimum distance dmin defined in (301) is sufficiently large, i.e., dmin ≥
κP

2 , for almost all the channel coefficients when P is large. Let us focus on the channel coefficients not
in the outage set Hout. Let xs, g0q0 +
√
P 1−α+Bg1q1 +
√
P 2α−1−Bg2q2. Then it is easy to show that the
error probability for the estimation of xs from the observation in (300) is
Pr[xs 6= xˆs]→ 0 as P →∞. (308)
Note that q0, q1, q2 can be recovered due to the fact that g0, g1, g2 are rationally independent. At this point
we can conclude that
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]→ 0 as P →∞ (309)
for almost all the channel coefficients.
B. 3α− 2 ≤ B ≤ 2α− 1
For this case with 2
3
≤ α ≤ 1 and 3α − 2 ≤ B ≤ 2α − 1, the proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.
We will just provide the outline of the proof in order to avoid the repetition. In this case, we will first
estimate v1,c from y1 expressed in (143) based on successive decoding method, and then we will estimate
v2,c and v1,p simultaneously based on noise removal and signal separation methods.
In the first step, we rewrite y1 from (143) to the following form
y1 =
√
Ph11v1,c +
√
P 2α−1g¯ + z1. (310)
where g¯, h12h21
h22
v2,c +
√
P 2−3αh11v1,p. Since g¯ is bounded, i.e., |g¯| ≤ 9τ ·2τ , from Lemma 12 we can
conclude that v1,c can be estimated from y1 with vanishing error probability:
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0, as P →∞. (311)
In the second step v2,c and v1,p will be estimated simultaneously from the following observation
y1 −
√
Ph11v1,c =
√
P 2α−1
h12h21
h22
v2,c +
√
P 1−αh11v1,p + z1
= γ(A0g0q0 + A1g1q1) + z1 (312)
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where g0, η2,ch12h21h22 , g1,
1
2
h11, A0,
√
P 2α−1−B+, A1,
√
P 2−3α+B+, q0,
√
PB−
η2,cγ
v2,c ,
q1, 2
√
P 2α−1−B−
γ
v1,p. By following the steps in (286)-(292), one can show that the v2,c and v1,p
can be estimated simultaneously from the observation in (312) with vanishing error probability for almost
all the channel coefficients. At this point, we can conclude that
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]→ 0 as P →∞ (313)
for almost all the channel coefficients.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
The proof of Lemma 8 is provided in this section for the case with α = 1. In this case v1,c and v2,c
will be estimated simultaneously from y1 expressed in (196) based on noise removal and signal separation
methods. Recall that the GDoF pair (d′1, d
′
2) considered here satisfies the conditions of d
′
1 ≤ 1 − d′2 and
0 ≤ d′2 ≤ 1. Let us first rewrite y1 expressed in (196) to the following form
y1 = ε
√
Ph11v1,c + ε
√
P
h12h21
h22
· v2,c + z1
= εγ(A0g0q0 + A1g1q1) + z1 (314)
where
g0, η1,ch11, g1,
η2,ch12h21
h22
, A0,
√
P 1−d
′
1+, A1,
√
P 1−d
′
2+, q0,
√
P d
′
1−
η1,cγ
· v1,c, q1,
√
P d
′
2−
η2,cγ
· v2,c
for γ ∈ (0, 1
τ ·2τ
]
, 1 ≤ η1,c < 2, 1 ≤ η2,c < 2, v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η1,cγQ , Q = P
d
′
1−
2 ) and v2,c ∈ Ω(ξ = η2,cγQ , Q =
P
d
′
2−
2 ). In this setting, q0, q1 ∈ Z , |q0| ≤
√
P d
′
1−, |q1| ≤
√
P d
′
2−. Let us define the following minimum
distance
dmin(g0, g1), min
q0,q′0∈Z∩[−
√
P d
′
1−,
√
P d
′
1−]
q1,q′1∈Z∩[−
√
P d
′
2−,
√
P d
′
2−]
(q0,q1)6=(q′0,q′1)
|A0g0(q0 − q′0) + A1g1(q1 − q′1)| (315)
which will be used for the analysis of the estimation of q0 and q1 from y1 expressed in (314). The lemma
below states a result on bounding this minimum distance.
Lemma 17. For α = 1, consider the signal design in (191)-(195). Let  > 0 and κ ∈ (0, 1]. Then the
minimum distance dmin defined in (315) satisfies the following inequality
dmin ≥ κP 2 (316)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ Hout, where the Lebesgue measure of the set Hout ⊆
(1, 2]2×2 satisfies
L(Hout) ≤ 1792κ · P− 2 . (317)
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Lemma 14. In this case we set η, 8 and
β,κP 2 , Q0, 2
√
P d
′
1−, Q1, 2
√
P d
′
2−.
Recall that g0 = η1,ch11, g1 =
η2,ch12h21
h22
, A0 =
√
P 1−d
′
1+, and A1 =
√
P 1−d
′
2+. We also define two
events B˜(q0, q1) and B˜ as in (255) and (256), respectively. By following the steps in (257)-(258), with
Lemma 13 involved, then the Lebesgue measure of B˜ satisfies the following inequality
L(B˜) ≤ 896κ · P− 2 . (318)
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With our definition, B˜ is a collection of (g0, g1) and can be treated as an outage set. Let us define Hout as
a set of (h11, h21, h12, h22) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 such that the corresponding pairs (g0, g1) are in the outage set B˜,
using the same definition as in (259). Then by following the steps in (260)-(262), the Lebesgue measure
of Hout can be bounded as
L(Hout) ≤ 1792κ · P− 2 . (319)
Lemma 17 suggests that, the minimum distance dmin is sufficiently large, i.e., dmin ≥ κP 2 , for almost
all the channel coefficients in the regime of large P . Let us focus on the channel coefficients not in the
outage set Hout. Let xs,A0g0q0 +A1g1q1. Then it is easy to show that the error probability for decoding
xs based on y1 (see (314)) is vanishing, i.e.,
Pr[xs 6= xˆs]→ 0 as P →∞. (320)
Since v1,c and v2,c can be recovered from xs, due to rational dependence, we finally conclude that
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v2,c 6= vˆ2,c}]→ 0 as P →∞
for almost all the channel coefficients.
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